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PRIVATE PLEA BARGAINS*
RIc SIMMONS**
This Article analyzes the phenomenon of private criminal settlements;
that is, settlements in which the victim or witness agrees not to report
the perpetrator to the police in exchange for some consideration on the
part of the perpetrator. The Article first examines why these settlements
occur and then determines whether they should be permitted.
There are two different paradigms that can be used in analyzing private
criminal settlements. The first paradigm, used by scholars who have
previously considered this issue, is to treat these settlements as a form
of blackmail. Legislatures in every state have used this paradigm to
criminalize private criminal settlements. But, as the Article points out,
the justifications for criminalizing these agreements under a blackmail
paradigm turn out to be particularly weak.
The Article goes on to analyze private criminal settlements under a
different paradigm, by treating them as the private analogue to public
plea bargains. Using this analysis, the true cost of these agreements
becomes apparent. Public plea bargains have long been criticized as
providing a sort of second-class justice, but many scholars have also
concluded that the process of plea bargaining brings certain benefits to
the criminal justice system. The Article applies the critiques of plea
bargaining to private criminal settlements, and concludes that private
settlements share all the drawbacks and costs of public plea bargains,
while providing almost none of the benefits.
The Article ends by discussing the implications of this analysis for
current laws regarding private criminal settlements. It concludes that
private criminal settlements should remain criminalized, but with one
significant exception: settlements made between individuals who had a
preexisting relationship should be permitted.
* @ 2011 Ric Simmons.
** Professor of Law, Moritz College of Law, The Ohio State University. The author
wishes to thank Angela Lloyd, Shawn Davisson, Doug Hattaway, and Brian Stewart for
assistance with this project and feedback on earlier drafts.
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INTRODUCTION
After a crime is committed, the victim or a witness will
frequently report the crime to the police, thereby commencing the
public criminal justice process. But, as it turns out, this course of
action is the atypical response to criminal activity Surveys have
shown that over half of violent crimes and about two-thirds of all
property crimes are unreported.2 This translates to roughly fourteen
million crimes each year that are not reported to the police.' And this
number only includes crimes with identifiable victims, such as assault
and theft, not "victimless" crimes such as narcotic sales, drug or
firearm possession, prostitution, and vandalism against state
property.' Although there are no reporting statistics for these crimes,
it is likely that many of them are witnessed by private individuals but
not reported to the police. The vast number of unreported crimes
raises an interesting question: when a witness or a victim does not
report a crime to the police, does he or she take any other action
toward the perpetrator?
Many times the answer is no. Often, the witness or victim may
not know the identity of the perpetrator. Or she may believe that
reporting the crime will be a waste of time because the police
response will be weak or nonexistent. Perhaps the perpetrator is a
friend or a family member, and the victim wishes to forgive and
forget. Or perhaps the perpetrator is able to intimidate or otherwise
persuade the witness not to report the crime. Or perhaps the injury-
whether to person or property-is so slight that it is simply easier to
move on rather than call the police or take any private action
(especially if the witness was not a victim of the crime).'
1. BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, NATIONAL CRIME
VICTIMIZATION SURVEY: CRIMINAL VICTIMIZATION, 2007, at 6 (2008), available at
http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf/cv07.pdf (showing a forty-six percent reporting
rate for violent crimes, and a thirty-seven percent reporting rate for property crimes).
These numbers are determined by household surveys in which respondents are asked
whether they have been victims of crimes, and if so, whether they reported the crime to
the police. Id. at 2.
2. Id. at 1.
3. According to the Bureau of Justice Statistics National Crime Victimization
Survey, there were approximately 17.5 million property crimes and 5.2 million crimes of
violence in 2007. Id. Based on the report rates, nearly fourteen million crimes in 2007 were
never reported to the authorities. Id. Because the crime rate in 2007 was "at or near the
lowest levels recorded since 1973," at least fourteen million crimes are never reported
each year. Id.
4. Id. at 2.
5. This reason has probably become more prevalent in recent decades as the state
continues to criminalize more conduct, thus creating more "crimes" which victims and
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But many nonreporting witnesses and victims do take some
action.' If they are victims of the crime, they may sue the perpetrator
in civil court, though it would be unusual to do this without having
reported the crime to the police.' They may impose their own private
punishment, either by taking a privilege away from the perpetrator,
or by acting as a vigilante and inflicting harm upon him.' If they have
a preexisting relationship with the perpetrator, they may sever or
alter that relationship, as when a wife leaves her abusive husband or a
company fires or penalizes an employee who embezzled money.
But there is one other possible option for a nonreporting witness
or victim: bargaining with the perpetrator. In making such a bargain,
the witness or victim promises to refrain from reporting the
perpetrator to the public authorities if the perpetrator takes (or
abstains from taking) some action. In other words, the witness or
victim and the perpetrator could reach a private settlement to resolve
the criminal dispute. In making these agreements, the private party is
essentially harnessing the power of the state and converting that state
authority into a more flexible, personalized power over the
perpetrator.9
Private criminal settlements come in many varieties. They may
occur between two private individuals who have (and wish to
maintain) a preexisting relationship, as in the case when the victim
and the perpetrator are family members. They may involve a retail
store or shopping mall which apprehends a customer who shoplifts
witnesses do not think are worth reporting. This is an example of the law of unintended
consequences: when the state overcriminalizes conduct, victims and witnesses may be less
likely to report criminal activity. See, e.g., Erik Luna, The Overcriminalization
Phenomenon, 54 AM. U. L. REV. 703, 727 (2005) ("Mistrusting citizens are less likely to
assist law enforcement and to obey legal commands, which undermines the efforts of
police and prosecutors and, paradoxically, renders the law counterproductive.").
6. See, e.g., Elizabeth E. Joh, Conceptualizing the Private Police, 2005 UTAH L. REV.
573, 589-91 (noting that Macy's private response to shoplifters is to ban them from the
store for seven years); David A. Sklansky, The Private Police, 46 UCLA L. REV. 1165,
1277 (1999) ("The sanctions [imposed by private companies in response to criminal
behavior] range from dismissal or ejection, to a return of purloined merchandise, to fines
or restitution extorted by the threat of criminal complaint.").
7. See infra Part I.A.
8. See infra Part I.B.
9. A good amount of energy is lost in this conversion process, since the method only
works if the perpetrator believes that (1) agreeing to the bargain will be less onerous than
being apprehended by the public authorities and (2) the state will not learn about the
crime from another source. But because the perpetrator has so much to gain from making
a private agreement-and because the victim or witness who negotiates with him gains so
little from instituting a public prosecution-there is quite a bit of room for negotiation. See
infra Part I.C.1.
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and decides that referring the case to the public criminal justice
system is too expensive and time consuming. And the witness may not
even be the victim of the crime; he or she could be a third party who
either accidentally discovered evidence of the crime or who actively
sought the information in order to extract a payment from the
perpetrator. Or these agreements may be a response to so-called
"victimless" crimes, when an individual or an organization threatens
to call the police unless the perpetrator pays money or agrees to
refrain from continuing the activity.
Should these private criminal settlements be permitted? The
general public may react to the idea of private criminal settlements in
different ways, depending on the context. A wife who was abused by
her husband but decides to give the perpetrator another chance if he
agrees to undergo counseling may seem sympathetic and even
laudable, while a retail store bullying a shoplifter into paying his way
out of an arrest may seem unsavory. A neighborhood association that
fights back against drug dealers by threatening them with criminal
prosecution if they do not leave the neighborhood also garners
sympathy, while a mercenary who stumbles upon criminal activity and
asks for money instead of calling the police seems greedy. But it is not
entirely clear how to legally distinguish between these different kinds
of cases-or indeed, whether we should draw any distinctions
between these cases. In order to fully understand the costs and
benefits of private criminal settlements, it is necessary to analyze
them from two different perspectives: both as blackmail and as
private plea bargains. The blackmail paradigm provides a necessary
framework for understanding the process of private criminal
settlements, but it is unable to provide a legitimate justification for
banning or regulating them. A private plea bargaining analysis reveals
the true costs of these settlements, and allows policymakers to make
informed decisions about the conditions under which these
settlements should be permitted.
Most of the scholars who have considered these private criminal
settlements have described them as blackmail 1o-the victim or witness
to the crime possesses incriminating information about the
perpetrator, and he or she is agreeing to keep that information secret
10. See, e.g., MIKE HEPWORTH, BLACKMAIL: PUBLICITY AND SECRECY IN
EVERYDAY LIFE 73-77 (1975); Mitchell N. Berman, The Evidentiary Theory of Blackmail:
Taking Motives Seriously, 65 U. CHI. L. REV. 795, 860 (1998); Jennifer Gerarda Brown,
Blackmail as Private Justice, 141 U. PA. L. REV. 1935, 1935-36 (1993); William M. Landes
& Richard A. Posner, Private Enforcement of Law, 4 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 42-44 (1975). For
further discussion, see Part II.
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if certain demands are met. Legislators agree with this
characterization: these arrangements have been criminalized in every
jurisdiction in the country, though some states provide limited
exceptions."
But, as it turns out, this perspective is incomplete. Indeed, this
Article argues that simply describing these private criminal
settlements as blackmail does not provide a compelling or even a
sufficient reason for their criminalization. The criminalization of
blackmail generally is somewhat controversial,12 and justifications for
criminalizing blackmail are particularly unpersuasive in the context of
private criminal settlement. In fact, treating these arrangements as
blackmail leads to a conclusion that almost all types of private
criminal settlements should be legalized, if not encouraged.
But these private settlements can also be analyzed from another
perspective: as a privatized form of plea bargaining. Given the
widespread privatization of our criminal justice system," it makes
sense to analyze private criminal settlements in this way. After all,
criminals can be investigated, arrested, and detained by private
police, without any involvement on the part of public law
enforcement; private plea bargains provide a method for a criminal
case to be resolved without the public criminal justice system ever
becoming involved.
As with public plea bargaining, the perpetrator who agrees to a
private settlement is voluntarily relinquishing certain rights in
exchange for a lesser punishment. However, the private agreements
are a more extreme version of public plea bargaining in two ways.
First, the perpetrator is giving up even more rights than he would in
traditional plea bargaining-such as the right to an attorney, the right
to have his charges formally presented to him, and the right to have a
neutral judge review the case and approve the agreement. Second, the
defendant is avoiding not only the full punishment he would receive
after a criminal trial, he is also avoiding even the collateral
punishments that the criminal justice system imposes on any
11. See infra Part IV.B.
12. See infra Part II.
13. See generally Joh, supra note 6 (discussing the expansion of private police forces in
the United States and their relationship with the public police and criminal justice
systems); Elizabeth E. Joh, The Paradox of Private Policing, 95 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 49 (2004) (examining how the private police have adopted and supplanted
many public police functions); Ric Simmons, Private Criminal Justice, 42 WAKE FOREST
L. REV. 911 (2007) (describing the history and growth of private police forces and their
role in a public criminal justice system); Sklansky, supra note 6 (providing extensive
discussion of the growing influence of private police forces).
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individual unwise or unlucky enough to be caught up in it: the
inconvenience of arrest, the possibility of pretrial incarceration, the
innumerable court appearances, and the stigma of a criminal
accusation.
It is only by analyzing private criminal settlements as a private
analogue to plea bargaining that the harmful aspects of these
agreements become clear. By examining private criminal settlements
as a form of private plea bargaining, we can see that these agreements
are problematic because they remove the prosecutor from the
settlement process. In public plea bargaining, the prosecutor plays a
critical role in selecting which cases should be prosecuted, how they
should be charged, and what sentence is appropriate.14 Without a
prosecutor present, the criminal settlement process cannot work
properly, and so-with one significant exception-these settlements
should be criminalized. The exception is the case in which a victim
and a perpetrator with a preexisting relationship negotiate a
settlement directly, a context which offers benefits (such as increased
efficiency, greater flexibility, and a higher possibility of preserving
these relationships) which are sufficient to overcome the problems
caused by the lack of a prosecutor.
Before we conduct these analyses, we must first define exactly
what we mean by private criminal settlements. Part I of this Article
will examine the variety of different actions that a private party can
take in response to criminal activity and categorize the different types
of private criminal settlements that are possible. Part II will examine
both the laws against blackmail and the rationale behind them, and
conclude that these rationales cannot provide a sufficient justification
for criminalizing private criminal settlements. Part III will then
compare private criminal settlements to public plea bargaining. Part
IV will discuss the implications of the analysis for current laws
regarding private criminal settlements.
14. See Gerard E. Lynch, Our Administrative System of Criminal Justice, 66
FORDHAM L. REV. 2117, 2123-24 (1998). Lynch describes the process of plea bargaining
as one in which the prosecutor is a de facto adjudicator in an administrative system, not an
advocate in an adversarial system. Id. at 2135. Although defense attorneys have the
opportunity to convince the prosecutor to make a more generous offer during plea
negotiations, the process essentially consists of the prosecutor offering a lower charge
and/or sentence in exchange for a guilty plea, and the defendant deciding whether to take
the offer or "opt out" of the administrative system and fight the charges in the adversarial
system. Id. at 2144.
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I. PRIVATE RESPONSES TO CRIMINAL ACTIVITY: AN OVERVIEW
As noted in the Introduction, a crime victim or witness who does
not report the crime to the police can still take some other action
against the perpetrator: she can sue the perpetrator in a civil suit (if
she suffered damages as a result of the crime); she could impose her
own private punishment against the perpetrator; or she could bargain
with the, perpetrator and get him to agree to furnish some
consideration in exchange for her silence-in essence, reaching a
private settlement that resolves the criminal case. In order to
understand exactly what we mean when we discuss private criminal
settlements, we must first describe the other possible actions that a
victim or witness could take.
A. Instituting a Civil Suit Against the Perpetrator
Victims of most crimes have the right to sue the perpetrator for
damages that they have suffered as a result of the crime. Many victims
will choose not to exercise this right, since the offender is often
judgment proof, and thus the time and expense required to hire a
lawyer and file a case is not worthwhile. We can assume that it is even
more unusual for a victim to fail to contact the police but still proceed
with a civil suit. Many of the reasons for not contacting the police in
the first place-the victim is intimidated by the perpetrator, the injury
or damage is too minor, or the victim does not know who the
defendant is-also preclude the filing of a civil suit. Even more
significantly, victims who do institute a civil suit have a strong
incentive to contact the police as well, since a criminal conviction will
be admissible in the victim's subsequent civil suit, thus lowering the
cost of winning a judgment."
Of course, victims and perpetrators frequently settle these civil
suits, resulting in a settlement agreement. However, these civil
settlement agreements need to be distinguished from private criminal
settlements: The former resolves all civil claims but does not preclude
the victim from contacting the police, and the perpetrator will almost
certainly face criminal sanctions in addition to the civil damages. In
contrast, private criminal settlements include an agreement on the
part of the victim that he or she will not contact the police, and thus
the perpetrator will not face any criminal sanctions as a result of his
conduct. As we will see below, this allows for a much greater
15. Under the doctrine of collateral estoppel, a criminal conviction is admissible in a
subsequent civil case and usually precludes the defendant from challenging the issue of
liability. See, e.g., Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co. v. Savickas, 739 N.E.2d 445, 449-50 (Ill. 2000).
1132 [Vol. 89
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bargaining range than a civil settlement, and consequently could
result in much more favorable terms for the victim.
B. Privately Punishing the Perpetrator
Victims also have the option of punishing the perpetrator
directly. The types of "punishments" imposed by the victim can be
placed into two separate categories. The first category is when the
victim merely withdraws privileges that had previously been extended
to the perpetrator (such as banning the perpetrator from the
property) or exercises a right pursuant to a previously existing
contract with the perpetrator (such as fining, demoting, suspending,
or docking the pay of an employee). This type of punishment is only
available to the victim of a crime, 16 and where the victim is acting
wholly within his or her legal rights in enacting the punishment.
In contrast, the second category of private punishments occurs
when the private actors (that is, the victims or witnesses) act against
the perpetrator in a way that goes beyond their legally recognized
power. For example, private security guards may be trained to hold
shoplifting suspects in custody for a short period of time while taking
statements and processing paperwork, effectively imprisoning them
for a few hours. Bouncers at a bar might unnecessarily inflict physical
pain on rowdy patrons in order to deter them from engaging in
unwanted behavior in the future, while victims of assault frequently
choose to fight back rather than call the police.
In its most extreme form, this second type of private punishment
takes the form of vigilantism-when an individual or group acts with
the purpose of imposing private punishment on individuals." America
has a dark history of such groups, from the lynchings carried out by
16. Certainly in some contexts the perpetrator may face repercussions from
nonvictims-for example, other department stores, gated communities, or casinos may bar
a known thief from entering their property, while other employers might learn of the
perpetrator's criminal activity at his previous employer and refuse to hire him-but such
actions are more accurately classified as collateral consequences of the perpetrator's
actions rather than direct punishment.
17. Note that some so-called vigilante groups who only seek to apprehend criminals
and then turn them over to the public authorities are not truly vigilantes under this
Article's definition, since they do not impose their own punishment on the criminal. An
example of these volunteer private police is the Minutemen, a group of private citizens
who patrol the border with Mexico in an attempt to apprehend illegal immigrants, but who
do not directly punish the illegal immigrants that they apprehend. See, e.g., Peter Nicholas
& Robert Salladay, Gov. Praises 'Minuteman' Campaign, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 29, 2005, at B1
(describing Governor Schwarzenegger's support of "armed volunteers" whose "practice is
not to apprehend people but to report instances of illegal crossings" even though
President Bush denounced the Minutemen as "vigilantes").
2011] 1133
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the Ku Klux Klan to modern-day abortion protestors assassinating
physicians who provide abortion services.'8 Vigilantes may be moved
to act by a number of different motivations: they may view certain
conduct as criminal even though the state does not; they may believe
that the police will not respond to the criminal conduct; or they may
believe that the sentence that would be imposed by the public system
will be too lenient. Vigilantes may not even be "victims" of the crime
in any real sense of the term; instead, they may be nonvictims taking
action against criminals in order to advance what they see as the
cause of justice, or perhaps individuals who see themselves as
suffering from "victimless" crimes, such as drug dealing or
prostitution.
Vigilantes and others who go beyond their legal rights to impose
a private punishment could be criminally liable for their actions." In
practice, however, criminal prosecution is likely to be rare for a
number of reasons. First, many prosecutors may be reluctant to bring
charges if a jury is likely to see the vigilante's punishment as
proportional to the perpetrator's crime.2 0 And second, the perpetrator
who is suffering the punishment no doubt realizes that if he reports
the punishment to the police, he may be arrested for the underlying
crime. In some cases, the private party inflicting the punishment may
explicitly explain that fact to the perpetrator (e.g., "Either I call the
police right now, or you stay here for a couple of hours while I
process these papers and have you sign a confession"). In these cases,
the second category of private responses overlaps with the third
category: private criminal settlements.
C. Threatening Criminal Prosecution in Order to Obtain a Benefit or
Take Away a Privilege
The final option for a nonreporting witness or victim is to
threaten to report the crime unless the perpetrator provides some
consideration. Unlike civil suits, this option is available to either
victims or witnesses, but only if two conditions are met: (1) the victim
18. One scholar has argued that vigilantism itself can provide a public good for the
criminal justice system by highlighting the existence of a new crime that has become more
prevalent or destructive. See Kelly D. Hine, Vigilantism Revisited: An Economic Analysis
of the Law of Extra-Judicial Self-Help or Why Can't Dick Shoot Henry for Stealing Jane's
Truck?, 47 AM. U. L. REV. 1221, 1244-48 (1998).
19. Id. at 1227 ("No state currently recognizes a 'Justified Vigilantism' or 'Community
Protection' defense to criminal prosecution. As a result, the established legal system treats
vigilantes no differently than other citizens.").
20. Id. at 1222 (describing a case in Texas in which a grand jury refused to indict some
security guards who beat thieves with belts and canes).
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PRIVATE PLEA BARGAINS
or witness knows the identity of the perpetrator, and (2) the victim or
witness has exclusive control over whether or not the crime is
reported. If there are other witnesses who can report the crime to the
police, the perpetrator has no reason to agree to the deal. Therefore,
this option is not available for every crime.21
1. Incentives to Enter into an Agreement
Because these arrangements must be made in secret, there is no
way of knowing how common these arrangements are. But bargaining
theory22 suggests that both parties have a great incentive to enter into
these agreements when the above two conditions are met. The victim
or witness receives some consideration from the defendant if an
agreement is reached, whereas his or her alternative to an
agreement-reporting the crime to the police-looks much less
appealing. The following table summarizes the costs and benefits to a
victim or witness of reporting a crime to the police.
21. In recent years, many jurisdictions have created state-sanctioned private plea
bargains: Victim-Offender Programs (VOPs) and Victim Offender Reconciliation
Programs (VORPs). These programs operate along the same principle as purely private
plea bargains-that is, if the defendant does not reach an agreement with the victim, he or
she will be prosecuted-but unlike purely private plea bargains, which can only occur if
the state does not yet know about the crime, VOPs and VORPs are created and
monitored by the state. See, e.g., VORP, http://www.vorp.org/ (last updated Apr. 14, 2010)
(describing the "safe mediation" between victims and offenders that allows the offender to
"make things as right as possible with the victim").
22. For a discussion of bargaining theory, see generally Robert J. Condlin, "Every
Day and in Every Way We Are All Becoming Meta and Meta," or How Communitarian
Bargaining Theory Conquered the World (of Bargaining Theory), 23 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP.
RESOL. 231 (2008).
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Table 1: Victim/Witness's Alternative to Agreement (Reporting the
Crime to the Police)
COST BENEFIT
Victim or witness is contributing to
prevention of crime generally, making
Immediate requirement of interview crime slightly less likely in this
and paperwork with police officer jurisdiction, and thus making victim or
witness slightly safer (theory of general
deterrence). 23
This specific perpetrator will know
that the victim will call the police if a
crime occurs and be less likely to
Strog pssiilit tht vctimwitess commit crirnes against him. This
will need to interview with prosecutor incent aies ont ims hoincentive applies only to victims who
report, not witnesses (theory of
specific deterrence). 24
The victim or witness will feel that he
Remote possibility that victim/witness or she is fulfilling a duty, by
will need to testify at trial contributing to public justice andhelping to ensure that those who
commit crime are punished.
Remote possibility that perpetrator
will seek retribution
The perpetrator, of course, must give up some consideration in
order to make a private agreement, but he is even more at risk if he
rejects the agreement. The following table summarizes the
perpetrator's costs and benefits of refusing to make a deal with a
victim or witness who is willing to bargain.
23. See JOSHUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAW 15 (4th ed. 2006).
24. See id. at 15-16.
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Table 2: Perpetrator's Alternative to Agreement (Refusing Victim's
Offer and Being Arrested and Prosecuted)
COST BENEFIT
Agreeing to terms of private
settlement means certain, immediate
consequences, while most of theDiscomfort/humiliation of arrest neteases of bi
negative aspects of public
punishment are not definite and are
far in the future.
Possibility of being held in jail until
arraignment (if no summons given)
Cost of attorney (if not eligible for
public defender)
Chance of being convicted (through trial
or plea bargain) and creating or adding
to criminal record
Expected sentence after conviction
Collateral consequences of conviction,
including stigma of being labeled a
criminal
The perpetrator has the more difficult calculation to make:
whereas an arrest and a brief incarceration before arraignment are
relatively certain, the possibility of conviction and ultimate sentence
are dependent on a number of factors, such as the strength of the case
against him, the willingness of the prosecutor to strike a deal, and the
disposition of the sentencing judge.25 Furthermore, the perpetrator
has additional risks in agreeing to the private settlement: there is
always the possibility that the victim or witness will take the
consideration and report the crime anyway.2 6 Finally, there is the
possibility that another witness or victim who is not party to the
private agreement will report the crime. The likelihood of this
possibility obviously depends on the facts and circumstances of the
case-thus, the more likely it is that a third party could report the
crime, the less likely a perpetrator will be willing to negotiate.
25. See, e.g., Oren Bar-Gill & Omri Ben-Shahar, The Prisoners' (Plea Bargain)
Dilemma, 1 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 737, 748-50 (2009) (listing factors that affect potential
trial outcome).
26. This possibility seems remote because the victim or witness is committing a crime
in even making the agreement and is unlikely to want to bring the entire incident to the
attention of the authorities once a deal has been struck.
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But when the perpetrator and the private party are both willing
to make a deal, there is a wide bargaining range for them to work
with-certainly a wider bargaining range than exists in the contexts of
traditional plea bargains between a prosecutor and a defendant.
During private negotiations, the victim or witness is free to offer any
kind of deal, unconstrained by legal or institutional requirements.
The only limit is what the defendant is willing to accept. A
prosecutor, on the other hand, has institutional limitations on what he
or she can or cannot do, and usually must choose among a limited
number of punishments: fine, community service, probation, and/or
incarceration.2 7
For his part, the perpetrator at the point of private apprehension
has more to lose by not making a deal than the defendant who is
negotiating with a prosecutor. A perpetrator who agrees to a private
criminal settlement can avoid all of the punishments-both direct and
indirect-of the public criminal justice system. The defendant in a
public plea bargaining setting has already been arrested, charged, and
brought to court.2 8 And even if he accepts the offer from the
prosecutor, he faces a criminal conviction and the accompanying
stigma and collateral consequences.29
2. Types of Private Plea Bargains
These private arrangements can be placed into three different
categories. The first category includes the agreements which arise out
of the crimes detected by private security guards. Private police-who
are much more numerous than their public counterpartsso-always
have the option of turning the suspect over to the public authorities
for adjudication and punishment, but this course of action may not be
in the best interest of the private employer.31 Cooperation with the
27. See DRESSLER, supra note 23, at 25 (explaining that the usual punishment after
conviction entails imprisonment and/or a fine).
28. Malcolm Feeley has written quite accurately that for lower-level crimes, "the
process itself is the punishment. The time, effort, money, and opportunities lost as a direct
result of being caught up in the system can quickly come to outweigh the penalty that
issues from adjudication and sentence." MALCOM M. FEELEY, THE PROCESS IS THE
PUNISHMENT: HANDLING CASES IN A LOWER CRIMINAL COURT 30-31 (1979). By its
very nature, public plea bargaining imposes this "punishment," while private plea
bargaining offers the defendant the chance to avoid this punishment altogether.
29. These extra costs, of course, will be lower for a defendant who already has
criminal convictions, since the stigma and collateral consequences of having a criminal
conviction already exist.
30. See Simmons, supra note 13, at 920-21.
31. See, e.g., Joh, supra note 6, at 587-88; Joh, supra note 13, at 86; Sklansky, supra
note 6, at 1189-90.
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authorities takes time-time that the private employer will likely
have to pay for.
The second category consists of agreements made by individuals
who already have a preexisting relationship with the perpetrator: a
friend or family member; or a neighbor, employer, or teacher. The
victim or witness may value the relationship with the perpetrator and
not want to jeopardize that relationship by calling the police and
potentially being required to testify against him. And although the
victim or witness might believe that the public criminal justice system
will treat the perpetrator too harshly, he or she still could demand
something from the perpetrator in return for not contacting the
authorities. For example, the victim may ask for restitution, or
require the perpetrator to undergo treatment or counseling. The
informal nature of the bargaining procedure, combined with the
ongoing relationship between the victim and the perpetrator, allow
for an extraordinary broad bargaining range and a high level of
flexibility in the negotiations.
The final category consists of agreements made by those who
seek out criminals for the express purpose of extracting concessions
from them. These individuals are not victims or witnesses in the
traditional sense; instead, they are private investigators who search
for incriminating evidence and then contact the perpetrator, offering
to keep the evidence secret in exchange for payment. Frequently the
investigators are motivated purely by financial gain, but not always.
Consider the following two hypothetical cases:
Residents of an urban neighborhood are fed up with the drug
dealers and prostitutes who work on their block. The police
occasionally arrest the criminals, but the dealers and prostitutes simply
return a few days later. Residents decide to take matters into their own
hands and form a neighborhood watch organization. Members of the
organization take turns observing and recording the criminal activity
that occurs in the area. When cars come through their neighborhood to
buy drugs or hire the prostitutes, the observers take pictures and then
write down the license plates of the cars. Every week the residents
determine the owners of the cars and then send letters to all of them.
The letters include pictures of the illegal transactions and explain to the
customers that the police will be contacted unless the customer
contributes $500 to the neighborhood watch organization. The money
is then used to hire part-time security guards, install better lighting, and
create after school programs for the neighborhood youth.
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A stockbroker in a midsized brokerage firm notices some unusual
patterns in the trades made by his officemate. She does some
investigation and learns that her officemate is illegally trading on inside
information given to him by his brother-in-law, who sits on the board
of several major publicly traded corporations. She confronts her
colleague and threatens to report him to the SEC unless he agrees to
pay her $50,000.
In the first example, the bargainer has motives which are
generally consistent with the public criminal justice system-deterring
crime, increasing security-but has determined that the best way to
advance those motives is to arrange a private criminal settlement
rather than contact the authorities. In the second example, the
individual is simply motivated by personal gain, seeking to uncover
the secrets of others in order to personally profit from them.
Of all the categories, this last hypothetical sounds the most
objectionable, because it seems the most similar to blackmail. But in
truth, every type of private criminal settlement is blackmail.32 Thus,
when a department store demands $200 in "restitution" from the
shoplifter, or the domestic violence victim requires her husband to
stop drinking and enroll in a program, or the neighborhood
organization demands money from those who commit crimes on their
block, all of these individuals or private groups are committing a
crime-usually a felony."
But does it make sense to criminalize any of these agreements?
As it turns out, the crime of blackmail itself is a controversial topic.
After decades of scholarship on the topic, there is still no consensus
among legal scholars as to whether blackmail should be a crime.3 4
And the controversy over criminalizing this conduct only becomes
more intense in the context of private criminal settlements. In the
next Part, we will evaluate the rationales for criminalizing blackmail
and see which of them apply to our particular brand of extortion.
32. See Richard A. Posner, Blackmail, Privacy, and Freedom of Contract, 141 U. PA.
L. REv. 1817, 1818 (1993). As Judge Posner explains, blackmail occurs any time an
individual "possesses information about his prospective victim that the latter would prefer
not be made public," and offers to keep the information quiet in exchange for
consideration. Id. Threatening to reveal information about the criminal activity of the
blackmailer's victim unless some consideration is paid is a type of blackmail. Id. at 1820.
33. See infra notes 35-36 and accompanying text.
34. See infra Parts II.B and II.C.
1140 [Vol. 89
2011] PRIVATE PLEA BARGAINS 1141
II. PRIVATE CRIMINAL SETTLEMENTS AS BLACKMAIL
Agreeing not to report a crime to the police in exchange for
consideration is illegal under blackmail statutes in every jurisdiction
in the United States," generally with potential penalties of a year or
more of imprisonment.36 Even so, there are two reasons to believe
that private criminal settlements still occur. First, as we have seen,
both parties have a strong incentive to engage in private criminal
bargaining.37 And second, the law against private criminal settlements
provides little in the way of deterrence because the chances of the
blackmail crime being detected are very small. As with other forms of
blackmail, private criminal settlements occur in secret, usually with
no witnesses aside from the two contracting parties. Both parties to
the agreement have reasons to keep the agreement confidential-in
fact, the "victims" of this type of blackmail arguably have an even
greater incentive than other blackmail victims, since they will face
arrest, prosecution, and punishment if the information is revealed.
More importantly, there is a significant scholarly debate as to
whether blackmail itself should be criminalized-and in particular,
whether the justifications for criminalizing blackmail apply to the
specific case of private criminal settlements.3 8 To help us review these
debates, we must first categorize blackmail cases based on how the
blackmailer acquires his or her information.39 One commentator has
35. Many states have broad blackmail statutes which prohibit private criminal
settlements. The federal statute is typical: "Whoever, under a threat of informing, or as a
consideration for not informing, against any violation of any law of the United States,
demands or receiveg any money or other valuable thing, shall be fined under this title or
imprisoned not more than one year, or both." 18 U.S.C. § 873 (2006); see also CAL. PENAL
CODE §§ 518, 519 (West 2010) (describing extortion as "fear" induced by a threat to
expose a secret or crime); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 135.60(4) (McKinney 2009) (describing the
offense of "coercion in the second degree" as a class A misdemeanor). Some statutes have
specific defenses andlor exceptions; we will consider these in Part IV.B infra.
Some states also make it a crime to fail to report a felony once a person has
knowledge that a felony was committed. See, e.g., OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2921.22(A)(1)
(LexisNexis 2010). Ohio's law provides for an exception for all privileged information and
exempts individuals from reporting family members. § 2921.22(G).
36. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 520 (West 2010) (setting out penalties of two to
four years for extortion of property).
37. See supra Part I.C.1.
38. See infra note 42 and accompanying text.
39. Many scholars also categorize blackmail along another axis, based on the type of
information used to blackmail the victim. This Article is only concerned with information
which would tend to prove the victim was involved in criminal activity. This so-called
"crime exposure blackmail" has itself been the subject of intense debate, mostly on the
question of whether allowing or even encouraging incriminating blackmail would increase
or decrease the crime rate. See, e.g., Berman, supra note 10, at 860-62 (arguing that "crime
exposure blackmail should be a crime" because its motivations prove that the blackmailer
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divided blackmail up into four different categories: "opportunistic
blackmail," in which the blackmailer accidentally comes upon the
information; "participant blackmail," in which the blackmailer and
the victim participated in the underlying act together; "commercial
research blackmail," in which the blackmailer invests resources to
discover the information; and "entrepreneurial blackmail," in which
the blackmailer creates incriminating information about the victim by
enticing or encouraging him or her to act in certain ways.' Participant
blackmail and entrepreneurial blackmail are distinct in that they
involve the blackmailer committing an additional crime;4' thus, there
is no real debate as to whether these forms of blackmail should be
considered criminal behavior. Therefore, this Article is only
concerned with opportunistic blackmail and commercial research
blackmail.
A. The Blackmail Debate Generally
Blackmail is a crime that has puzzled commentators and scholars
for decades.42 It is an offense that feels intuitively wrong to many
individuals, but it is difficult to explain why the activity should be
criminalized. Most scholars begin their discussion of blackmail by
describing the "blackmail paradox"43 : it is not a crime to disclose
information, and it is not a crime to ask for payment in exchange for
not doing something you are legally permitted to do, but it is a very
serious crime to combine the two legal activities and ask for payment
is a morally blameworthy actor); Brown, supra note 10, at 1974 (arguing that incriminating
blackmail may reduce crime but should still be illegal because "we fundamentally alter the
quality of justice when we take enforcement away from a public audience"); Landes &
Posner, supra note 10, at 42-44 (concluding that there is no way to know the effect of
legalizing incriminating blackmail on the crime rate).
40. See HEPWORTH, supra note 10, at 74-77.
41. In participant blackmail, the blackmailer and the victim committed the underlying
crime together. Id. at 76-77. In entrepreneurial blackmail, the blackmailer causes the
victim to engage in criminal activity, and thus could be considered an accessory to the
crime. See id. at 74-75.
42. There is a vast amount of literature on this subject, but the most relevant articles
to our discussion are Brown, supra note 10; Landes & Posner, supra note 10; Posner, supra
note 32; and Steven Shavell, An Economic Analysis of Threats and Their Illegality:
Blackmail, Extortion, and Robbery, 141 U. PA. L. REv. 1877 (1993).
For general background on the blackmail debate, see generally Berman, supra
note 10; Walter Block & Gary M. Anderson, Blackmail, Extortion, and Exchange, 44
N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 541 (2001); Russell J. Christopher, Meta-Blackmail, 94 GEO. L.J. 739
(2006); Richard A. Epstein, Blackmail, Inc., 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 553 (1983); James
Lindgren, Unraveling the Paradox of Blackmail, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 670 (1984); Henry E.
Smith, The Harm in Blackmail, 92 Nw. U. L. REV. 861 (1998).
43. See, e.g., Berman, supra note 10, at 796.
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in exchange for not disclosing information. Given this anomaly,
dozens of law professors, philosophers, and economists have all
struggled to come up with a theory to explain why blackmail should
be criminalized;" in contrast, a small minority of scholars has argued
that blackmail should not be a crime because there is no theory that
adequately justifies its criminalization.45
An exhaustive examination of each of these justifications is
beyond the scope of the Article,46 but we must consider them briefly
in order to determine which of them apply specifically to private plea
bargaining. As we will see, many of the justifications for criminalizing
blackmail simply do not apply in the private plea bargaining context,
while others become even more compelling.
B. Utilitarian Justifications
1. Blackmail Is "Inefficient"
The primary argument for criminalizing blackmail from a
utilitarian perspective is that blackmail is an economically inefficient
activity. In the paradigmatic case, the blackmailer will invest
resources in finding out about the victim's activity, and then ask the
victim to pay money to the blackmailer in order to not disclose the
information. As one commentator argues, this is akin to "digging up
dirt, at real resource cost, and then reburying it."4 7 If blackmail were
legalized, entire industries would spring up devoted to finding the
most embarrassing and damaging secrets about individuals, extracting
44. For an excellent overview and taxonomy of the different theories, see id. at 799-
833. Of course, after rejecting all of the existing theories as flawed, Professor Berman
proposes his own justification for the criminalization of blackmail. Id. at 833-52. For an
overview of these theories as applied to incriminatory blackmail specifically, see Brown,
supra note 10, at 1950-66.
45. See, e.g., Joseph Isenbergh, Blackmail from A to C, 141 U. PA. L. REV. 1905, 1907-
08, 1925-32 (1993) (arguing from a law and economics perspective that the social cost to
criminalizing blackmail outweighs the social benefit); see also Ronald H. Coase, The 1987
McCorkle Lecture: Blackmail, 74 VA. L. REV. 655, 674 (1988) ("It would be better if this
[ultimately suppressed] information were not collected and the resources were used to
produce something of value.").
46. As of March 1, 2011, a LexisNexis search revealed sixty-two articles and notes
with the word "blackmail" in the title. Search Results for "Blackmail" Within the Title of
an Article in the "US Law Reviews and Journals" Database, LExISNEXIS,
http://www.lexisnexis.com (last visited Apr. 14, 2011).
47. Douglas H. Ginsburg & Paul Shechtman, Blackmail: An Economic Analysis of the
Law, 141 U. PA. L. REV. 1849, 1860 (1993); see also Shavell, supra note 42, at 1897-99
(discussing the costs of blackmail to both the blackmailer and the subject of the
blackmail).
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payment for these secrets, and then destroying the information they
found.
There are two possible responses to this utilitarian argument.
The most powerful response is to simply ask: so what? Economic
inefficiency is hardly a sufficient justification for criminalization.
People engage in economically inefficient behavior all the time-from
taking long drives through the country to making trades on their
fantasy football team-and nobody argues those behaviors are
criminal. 48 As a voluntary transaction between consenting adults,49
blackmail should not be criminalized unless-as is at least arguably
true for selling drugs, pornography, or sex-there is some negative
externality caused by the transaction that is damaging to society.so
Another response to the economic inefficiency argument is that
it paints with too broad a brush. Here it is important to distinguish
between commercial research blackmail and opportunistic blackmail.
In the former case, the actions by the blackmailer do indeed seem
inefficient-he or she has invested resources in finding this
information, only to hide it again. But in the latter case, the victim is
merely buying a commodity from a blackmailer who happened to
stumble on the information, and it is difficult to see how there are any
wasted resources. The blackmailer may be unjustly enriched to some
extent, but this is hardly a reason to criminalize the behavior.
The inefficiency justification for criminalizing blackmail is even
weaker when applied to the specific context of private criminal
settlements. In fact, it is possible that private criminal settlements-
what at least one commentator has labeled "incriminating
blackmail"s'-do serve a socially useful purpose in that they exact a
cost from the criminal and thereby deter criminal activity.52 But here,
48. See Block & Anderson, supra note 42, at 546 ("There are lots of idle, time wasting,
'sterile' activities which, presumably, no one would wish to make into a criminal offense:
watching soap operas, reading poetry, listening to non-baroque music, gardening and
camping.").
49. Some commentators have argued that blackmail is not actually voluntary, since it
involves an implied threat: pay me money or I will reveal unpleasant information about
you. See, e.g., Posner, supra note 32, at 1819 (stating that blackmail is similar to duress
because "both involve threats"). But most economists reject this characterization, arguing
that the blackmail transaction-since it does not involve a threat of violence-is no more
"coercive" than any other free-market exchange. See, e.g., Block & Anderson, supra note
42, at 545 ("Every voluntary interaction can be couched in the form of a threat.").
50. As we will see below, there is a possibility that incriminating blackmail might have
a positive externality by increasing deterrence and thereby decreasing the crime rate.
51. See Brown, supra note 10, at 1936.
52. There is some debate as to the net effect that allowing private plea bargains would
have on overall deterrence. On the one hand, the blackmailer by definition will exact a
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the distinction between opportunistic blackmail and commercial
research blackmail becomes significant for an entirely new reason:
opportunistic blackmailers may in fact decrease deterrence, and
commercial research blackmailers almost certainly increase
deterrence.
Opportunistic blackmailers acquire evidence of a crime through
chance, usually by being witnesses or victims of a crime. In the
absence of incriminatory blackmail, many of these victims and
witnesses would contact the police, which would lead to the optimal
level of deterrence-or at least the level of deterrence that is
generally provided by the public criminal justice system. But if
incriminatory blackmail is encouraged and becomes more
widespread, there may be a decrease in overall deterrence since these
witnesses and victims would be more inclined to extract their own
penalties from the defendant. Because the defendant would not agree
to the deal unless it provided better terms than he would receive from
the public criminal justice system, the private criminal settlement
penalties would not be as severe as what the public system would
provide, thus leading to a lower level of deterrence.
Professor Landes and Judge Posner add two points to this
underdeterrence argument: first, a private blackmailer can only
extract money from the perpetrator, and, second, the perpetrator may
not have sufficient resources to pay a price which is equivalent to the
punishment that he or she deserves." Thus, the private blackmailer
will be forced to settle for even less than he would otherwise
demand.54 In contrast, the state can incarcerate a perpetrator for an
appropriate period of time regardless of the perpetrator's financial
resources.
One flaw in this argument is that it assumes that money is the
only consideration that the perpetrator can give to the blackmailer. In
fact, one of the appealing aspects of incriminatory blackmail (as with
any form of alternative dispute resolution) is its flexibility: the
blackmailer could demand services from the perpetrator, or require
that he abstain from certain behaviors, or request any other kind of
lower cost than the criminal would face if the crime was reported (otherwise there would
be no bargain). See Landes & Posner, supra note 10, at 42. On the other hand, victims and
witnesses who would never report the crime to the authorities might engage in
incriminating blackmail, thus increasing the number of criminals who must face
consequences for their actions. See Brown, supra note 10, at 1941-50; Shavell, supra note
42, at 1899.
53. See Landes & Posner, supra note 10, at 42.
54. Id.
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consideration. Therefore, even the very poor who have no financial
resources could still suffer some punishment-and thus be deterred-
by incriminatory blackmail.
Even if we assume that allowing opportunistic incriminatory
blackmail would result in a lower level of deterrence, it is not clear
that society would be any worse off because opportunistic blackmail
achieves some level of deterrence and expends far fewer state
resources than the public criminal justice system would. In other
words, in the same way that public plea bargaining offers a defendant
a reduced sentence (and thereby provides less deterrence) in
exchange for a saving of resources, opportunistic blackmail offers an
even lighter sentence in exchange for not using any state resources.
Although the punishment may be inadequate to sufficiently deter the
defendant from committing the crime again, it certainly provides
some deterrence to the defendant, and at no cost to the state.
Finally, some commentators have disputed the very premise of
the underdeterrence argument, noting that even for opportunistic
blackmail, there are situations in which the victim or witness would
never call the police even if the private criminal settlement option
were unavailable.s" Some crimes between friends and family members
could go unreported if the victim does not want law enforcement to
get involved in the case. Likewise, private security guards who catch
people trespassing or shoplifting might never report the crime to the
police, since the time and money it would take to do so would not be
worthwhile. If a ban on private criminal settlements was effectively
enforced, the perpetrators would receive no punishment and would
thus not be deterred at all.56 Thus, a law which permitted
opportunistic blackmail only in cases where the victim or witness
would be unlikely to call the police would help to minimize the harm
of these agreements.
Commercial research blackmail, on the other hand,
unequivocally increases deterrence. Unlike the opportunistic
blackmailer, the commercial research blackmailer would not have
even known about the crime, much less reported it, if he or she had
not been given the incentive of payment from the perpetrator."
Legalizing incriminatory blackmail would encourage third parties to
55. See Brown, supra note 10, at 1954-55.
56. Granted, in these cases, the victim's or witness's threat to punish is a bluff, but as
with all bluffs it could be persuasive enough to convince the perpetrator to agree to the
victim's or witness's demands.
57. See Brown, supra note 10, at 1954.
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seek out evidence of a crime that by definition would otherwise
remain undiscovered." This would result in an increase of private
detection of criminal activity, and a corresponding increase in private
payments from perpetrators to blackmailers, thus increasing the cost
of crime in general and increasing the amount of deterrence.
In other words, opportunistic incriminatory blackmail actually
saves resources, since it costs the state nothing and inflicts some type
of punishment on the perpetrator-although it achieves less
deterrence than the public criminal justice system would. Commercial
research incriminatory blackmail uses private resources, but they are
not wasted: they result in certain crimes being discovered and
indirectly punished through a blackmail payment.59 Because these
crimes would otherwise remain undiscovered and unpunished,
commercial research and opportunistic incriminatory blackmail thus
increases deterrence.
2. Blackmail Encourages Fraud, Theft, and Secrecy
Some utilitarians, notably Richard Epstein, argue that blackmail
should be criminalized, not because it is inherently harmful, but
because its practice leads to socially undesirable results, such as fraud
and theft.' Blackmail does this in two ways: first, it leads otherwise
law-abiding citizens to commit theft in order to pay the blackmailer's
demands;6 1 and second, the blackmailer will have an incentive to
ensure that the victim's secret (i.e., his criminal activity) is kept safe,
and so he will encourage the victim to keep silent about his crime and
advise him on how to do so.62
This argument is not unique to blackmail-it can be used to
justify other so-called "victimless crimes" such as drug use,
prostitution, and gambling-but in most other cases it is not offered
as the sole reason for criminalization. Although drug addicts and
compulsive gamblers can and do commit theft to support their habits,
these acts are also criminalized because they are inherently damaging
to the individual-that is, they have a paternalistic justification as
well. And, at least traditionally, there is a strong moral component to
58. Commercial research blackmailers could only profit off of crimes which were
undiscovered or unsolved by the public authorities, so any investigations they undertake
would focus on these crimes.
59. Brown, supra note 10, at 1945-46.
60. See Epstein, supra note 42, at 562-66.
61. See Smith, supra note 42, at 862-63 (arguing that blackmail creates such a strong
sense of fear in the victim that he will do anything to keep the information secret).
62. See Epstein, supra note 42, at 564.
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the criminalization of these actions: gambling or using drugs or
prostitutes is considered to be morally wrong by many people. In
short, utilitarians would find it hard to justify laws against drug
possession, prostitution, and gambling on utilitarian grounds alone,
especially since there is a reasonable argument that criminalizing
these actions creates more harm to society than the underlying act
itself. And in the end, the underlying undesirable activity-the theft
or fraud-is already itself criminalized, and presumably punishments
for theft and fraud could be increased if the state wanted more
deterrence.
Likewise, it is hard to justify criminalizing blackmail solely based
on the fraud or theft that it might encourage. Unlike drug addiction
or compulsive gambling, there is no real argument that the
blackmailer needs to be protected from himself. Furthermore, not all
blackmail leads to fraud and theft;' nor is there any evidence that it
leads to fraud and theft more often than other perfectly legal
activities.
Epstein's other point-that blackmail leads to secrecy"-is self-
evident. Obviously a blackmailer will have an incentive to help his
victim keep the information secret-it is valuable information to the
blackmailer, after all-and so this would conceivably encourage the
blackmailer to give advice and even assistance as to how to prevent
others from discovering the information.' But this argument has very
little force in justifying a general ban on blackmail. Secrecy in and of
itself is not against the law; in fact, we value secrecy and privacy in
many contexts.66 If the blackmailer assists his victim in protecting
information that the victim would prefer to keep private-perhaps his
sexual orientation or a sexual indiscretion in the past-the assistance
would probably be welcomed by the victim as a positive byproduct of
the blackmailing process.
However, when applied to incriminatory blackmail, the secrecy
concern becomes more legitimate. Incriminatory blackmailers are not
63. See, e.g., Berman, supra note 10, at 815-16 (using the example of an individual
blackmailing his victim by demanding sexual favors in exchange for not revealing the fact
of her illegitimate birth).
64. See Epstein, supra note 42, at 562.
65. Id. at 564.
66. For example, a person may privately enjoy certain activities that would be
embarrassing to him or her if coworkers or family members knew about them-anything
from unorthodox hobbies, like knitting or playing bagpipes, to unusual sexual practices.
On a more serious level, businesses keep trade secrets, and governments keep state
secrets. Both types of secrets are generally considered to be beneficial, if not necessary, in
a modern society.
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merely helping victims keep embarrassing information secret; they
are helping to cover up crimes. The blackmailer is likely to become an
accessory after the fact by helping to prevent detection of the crime
by law enforcement."7 This problem is particularly acute for
commercial research blackmailers; since they are likely to be repeat
players in the industry who invest resources to unearth evidence and
track down witnesses that could incriminate the perpetrator, such
evidence could be destroyed and witnesses could be deterred from
testifying if the perpetrator pays the asking price. In this sense, under
Epstein's utilitarian theory, incriminating blackmail is the worst kind
of blackmail, and commercial research blackmailers are the worst
kind of blackmailers.8
Even so, Epstein's objection still covers only a byproduct of
blackmail, not the blackmail itself. Just as the fraud and deception
which sometimes accompany blackmail are independently
criminalized, so is the crime of hindering the apprehension or
prosecution of a crime.69 If commercial research blackmail were
legalized, penalties for assisting in the cover-up could be increased."
Additionally, a jurisdiction could criminalize any further
compensation after the initial payment to the commercial research
blackmailer. This would effectively eliminate the blackmailer's
incentive to help with any cover-up, since he or she would have no
interest in whether the perpetrator was ultimately apprehended.
67. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 3 (2006) ("Whoever, knowing that an offense against the
United States has been committed, receives, relieves, comforts or assists the offender in
order to hinder or prevent his apprehension, trial or punishment, is an accessory after the
fact."); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-7 (2009) (criminalizing accessory after the fact).
68. Opportunistic blackmailers-victims or others who just happen to witness a
crime-are far less likely to be able to provide any useful assistance to the perpetrator.
They can guarantee their own silence, of course, but they will generally not be in a
position to help the perpetrator cover up the crime or hide it more effectively from the
authorities.
69. See, e.g., MODEL PENAL CODE § 242.3(3) (1985) (stating that it is a crime to
"conceal[] or destroy[] evidence of the crime, or tamper[] with a witness, informant,
document, or other source of information .... ").
70. The Model Penal Code makes this crime a third-degree felony if the defendant is
assisting in covering up a first- or second-degree felony, but the crime is only a
misdemeanor if the defendant is assisting in covering up any other kind of crime. See
§ 242.3. Blackmail is "theft by extortion." See id. § 223.4 ("A person is guilty of theft if he
purposely obtains property of another by threatening to ... accuse anyone of a criminal
offense .... "). Under section 223.1(2)(a), the Code punishes theft as a third-degree felony
if the amount demanded exceeds $500. See id. § 223.1(2)(a). Thus, if blackmail were
legalized, it would make sense to increase the crime level for concealing evidence to a
third-degree felony in all cases, thus providing the necessary amount of deterrence to
those blackmailers who are tempted to provide criminal assistance to those whom they are
blackmailing.
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In the end, utilitarian theories do not seem to sufficiently explain
why most individuals believe that blackmail should be illegal."
Blackmail has been criminalized not because it wastes resources or
because it could lead to other crimes, but because people believe it is
morally wrong.72 We therefore turn our attention to the retributive
justifications for criminalizing blackmail.
C. Retributive Justifications
At the outset, many of the retributive justifications. for
criminalizing blackmail fail because of a mischaracterization of the act
itself-specifically, a conflation of extortion with coercion." If an
individual blackmails his victim by threatening to carry out an illegal
act against the victim unless a payment is made, then the individual
has coerced the victim, not blackmailed him. For example, if A
threatens to burn down B's house, or break B's kneecaps, or kidnap
B's child unless B pays A $100,000, the transaction may look like
blackmail, but it is not. True blackmail consists of the blackmailer
threatening to take an action that is not criminal, which the
blackmailer has every legal right to do-usually the disclosure of
information-unless the victim complies with the blackmailer's
demand. This is the essence of the "paradox" of blackmail-how two
legal actions can combine to create a crime.74
71. Utilitarians offer a number of other justifications for criminalizing blackmail, but
none of them are able to justify the breadth of the blackmail prohibition-in particular,
they would not serve to justify criminalizing incriminating blackmail. For example, one
commentator argues that legalizing blackmail would create an incentive for individuals to
invade each other's privacy in the search for potentially valuable information. See, e.g.,
Jeffrie G. Murphy, Blackmail: A Preliminary Inquiry, 63 MONIST 156, 165 (1980). If the
potential blackmailers were in fact only looking for incriminating blackmail, a utilitarian
would almost certainly concede that the cost of the invasion of privacy would be
outweighed by the benefit of exposing more criminal conduct. Of course, if the invasion of
privacy went so far as to constitute an independent crime-a trespass, perhaps, or a theft
of private property-the potential blackmailer would be criminally liable without the need
for a blackmail prohibition.
72. Professor Mitchell Berman, who provides an excellent summary of the various
utilitarian and retributive justifications for blackmail, expresses this idea very well, stating
that the utilitarian justifications "fail even to approximate common intuitions regarding
what's wrong with blackmail." Berman, supra note 10, at 820.
73. See Epstein, supra note 42, at 555-57 (distinguishing illegal threats of physical
violence from nonviolent, legal threats); Posner, supra note 32, at 1818-19 (noting that
blackmail "is often grouped" with contracts made under duress, such as when a gun-
wielding assailant says, "Your money or your life").
74. See, e.g., Berman, supra note 10, at 796.
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1. An Illegal Offer
At least one commentator has attempted to justify blackmail on
retributive grounds by narrowing the definition of blackmail to cover
only those cases when the action the blackmailer threatens or offers
to undertake is itself illegal." As noted above, a threat to do
something illegal transforms the blackmail into coercion, which
provides an easy case for justifying criminalization. But if the offer is
illegal, the blackmailer is in effect committing two crimes: solicitation
to commit the underlying crime (whatever he or she is offering to do)
and the blackmail itself (receiving payment in exchange for
committing the illegal act).
One problem with this narrow definition of blackmail is that it
would decriminalize most acts of extortion-acts which many people
consider should be criminal-such as threatening to disclose adultery
or sexual orientation.76 But for the purposes of justifying
incriminatory blackmail, the definition could potentially be useful if
failing to report a crime were itself a crime. If so, the incriminatory
blackmailer who offers to remain silent in exchange for consideration
is offering to commit an illegal act for money. In a sense, the
blackmailer is offering to enter into an illegal conspiracy with the
victim.
But this justification for criminalizing incriminatory blackmail
does not get us very far because modern criminal law does not impose
a general duty to report a crime.77 The common law offense of failure
to report a crime-known as misprision of a felony-was created
centuries ago, during a time before professional police forces
existed.78 In that era, ordinary citizens were required to apprehend
felons themselves, or, barring that, to raise a "[h]ue and cry" so that
other citizens could respond.7 9 The crime was ultimately abolished by
twentieth-century judges who applied the principle that a mere
75. See 4 JOEL FEINBERG, THE MORAL LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL LAW: HARMLESS
WRONGDOING 240-58 (1988).
76. See Berman, supra note 10, at 821-22 (calling this narrow definition "startling").
77. See infra notes 81-82 and accompanying text; see also Brown, supra note 10, at
1944-49 (comparing the desirability of incriminatory blackmail in jurisdictions where there
is a duty to report crime with jurisdictions where there is no such duty).
78. See Gabriel D. M. Ciociola, Misprision of Felony and Its Progeny, 41 BRANDEIS
L.J. 697, 699 (2003).
79. Daniel B. Yeager, A Radical Community of Aid: A Rejoinder to Opponents of
Affirmative Duties to Help Strangers, 71 WASH. U. L.Q. 1, 39 (1993); see also Ciociola,
supra note 78, at 702 ("In England, before the seventeenth century, primary responsibility
for law enforcement was not delegated to paid, full-time professionals; the community as a
whole was obliged to combat the crime.").
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omission cannot be a crime." The drafters of the Model Penal Code
likewise declined to make nonreporting a crime, and currently only
two states have laws which criminalize the nonreporting of a crime."'
Federal law only prohibits active "concealment" of the crime,82 which
courts have interpreted to mean more than merely the omission of
nondisclosure; to be convicted a defendant must also commit some
kind of affirmative action, such as lying to investigators or concealing
evidence.
In short, this justification for criminalizing incriminatory
blackmail is not very persuasive. The law rejects the idea that the
mere nonreporting of a crime should itself be a crime, following the
basic criminal law principle that omissions cannot themselves be
criminal." There are some exceptions to this principle, of course, and
80. Ciociola, supra note 78, at 710-21.
81. Id. at 726; see also MODEL PENAL CODE § 242.5 cmt. (1985) ("The Model Code
accords with the vast majority of jurisdictions in assigning no penalty to simple failure to
inform authorities of criminal conduct."); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2921.22 (LexisNexis
2010) ("[No person, knowing that a felony has been or is being committed, shall
knowingly fail to report such information to law enforcement authorities."); S.D.
CODIFIED LAWS § 22-11-12 (2006) ("Any person who, having knowledge, which is not
privileged, of the commission of a felony, conceals the felony, or does not immediately
disclose the felony, including the name of the perpetrator, if known, and all of the other
relevant known facts, to the proper authorities, is guilty of misprision of a felony."). Both
statutes apply only to felonies and are subject to certain exceptions. See § 2921.22; § 22-11-
12. Both statutes make an exception if the information about the crime is privileged. See
§ 2921.22; § 22-11-12. Ohio's law also exempts "information that would tend to incriminate
a member of the actor's immediate family." See § 2921.22(G)(2).
82. See 18 U.S.C. § 4 (2006) ("Whoever, having knowledge of the actual commission
of a felony cognizable by a court of the United States, conceals and does not as soon as
possible make known the same to some judge or other person in civil or military authority
under the United States, shall be fined not more than $500 or imprisoned not more than
three years, or both.").
83. Stuart P. Green, Uncovering the Cover-up Crimes, 42 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 9, 23
(2005). Professor Green notes:
As interpreted by the courts, passive failure to report a crime does not constitute
'concealment'; a defendant must engage in some affirmative act, such as making a
false statement to an investigator, seeking to divert the attention of the police,
harboring a felon, or retrieving and secreting proceeds of evidence of a crime.
Indeed, the affirmative act requirement is so important that one court concluded
that a defendant's truthful but incomplete disclosure of what he knew about an
alleged counterfeiting operation did not constitute misprision, since it did not
result in any greater concealment than would have occurred if the defendant had
remained silent.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
84. See DRESSLER, supra note 23, at 109-10. For an excellent discussion of this issue,
see generally Joshua Dressier, Some Brief Thoughts (Mostly Negative) About "Bad
Samaritan" Laws, 40 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 971 (2000) (stating the general rule that
omissions are not criminal, explaining the reasons for such rule, and noting the exceptions
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the "illegal offer" justification is sensible under the rare
circumstances when specific individuals are legally bound to report
evidence of a crime. For example, law enforcement officers (who
have a duty to report and enforce the criminal law) are obviously
making an illegal offer when they request money in exchange for not
reporting a crime. Also, many states impose a specific crime reporting
duty on certain professions. For example, physicians who see
evidence of gunshots or other violence are frequently required to
report the incident to the police," while certain professionals are
"mandated reporters" for child abuse.6 Furthermore, a handful of
states require eyewitnesses to report certain violent felonies and
rapes, though prosecutions under these statutes are extraordinarily
rare." In other words, if an individual has a statutory duty to report a
crime, then it should be a crime for that individual to agree to violate
that duty by withholding the information in exchange for money. But
there is nothing in this justification to suggest that all incriminatory
blackmail should be illegal.
2. The Blackmailer as a "Parasite"
Professor James Lindgren has argued that blackmail is morally
wrong because the blackmailer is offering to sell something that does
not truly "belong" to him-that he "interposes himself parasitically in
an actual or potential dispute in which he lacks a[n] ... interest.""
For example, if an employer would want to know about an
employee's drug problem and the blackmailer demands and receives
money from the employee in order to keep the drug use secret from
the employer, then the blackmailer has in a sense profited from
information that would be valuable to the employer. In other words,
and justifications for the exceptions to the general rule).
85. See Ciociola, supra note 78, at 730.
86. See id. at 731. Many states have so-called mandated reporting laws requiring
certain professionals (such as social workers, school personnel, health care workers,
mental health professionals, and childcare providers) to report any signs of child abuse to
the authorities. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 11165.7, 11166 (West Supp. 2011) (defining
who is included as a "mandated reporter" and requiring mandated reporters who have
knowledge of or observe a child who is the victim of abuse and neglect to report such
abuse or neglect).
87. Ciociola, supra note 78, at 730-42. Three states (Massachusetts, Rhode Island, and
Washington) require reporting of violent felonies, though as of 2003 no prosecutions have
been reported under any of these laws. Id. at 730-35. Three states (Vermont, Minnesota,
and Rhode Island) require assistance to those in peril. Id. at 735-38. And Florida and
Rhode Island have laws specifically requiring contacting the police if one witnesses a
sexual assault. Id. at 740-42.
88. Lindgren, supra note 42, at 702.
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the blackmailer has inserted himself as an unwanted intermediary
between the victim and the person who would like to have this
information, thus effectively stealing the money from both of them.89
The "parasitical" argument has intuitive appeal, but it also has
been criticized for not fully explaining why this particular type of
exploitation should be considered criminal.90 For example, if it is
immoral-even criminal-to profit as a "parasite" for not revealing
information, then why is it not immoral to profit by revealing the
information? What if, for example, the blackmailer learned about the
employee's drug use and offered to sell the information to the
employer? What about a company that spends resources to locate
untapped lucrative oil reserves, finds them underneath a farmer's
fields, and then offers to sell the precise location to an oil company?
There are plenty of legitimate situations where an individual learns
information about one person which would be valuable to another
and offers to sell the information-in effect bargaining with someone
else's information. Why is it then criminal to offer to not disclose the
information?
But once again, although this argument is a relatively weak
justification for the criminalization of blackmail generally, it appears
to carry more weight for incriminating blackmail specifically. In the
case of incriminating blackmail, the blackmailer is inserting himself
between the perpetrator and the state-thus, he is not merely
bargaining with chips that belong to an employer or a wronged
spouse, but bargaining with chips that belong to the state. The
blackmailer in this case has become an "unauthorized agent for the
public,"" using a unique type of leverage that comes from the
criminal justice system, a leverage that has been put into place to
further the cause of justice and is now being subverted to further the
blackmailer's own personal goals.
This argument can best be understood by using an analogy with
tort law. Plaintiffs and defendants in civil cases frequently reach out-
of-court settlements, with the plaintiff agreeing to forgo the lawsuit in
exchange for a monetary payment from the defendant. Incriminating
blackmail is analogous to a third party learning about a personal
89. Professor Lindgren gives an example of a woman who learns that a company is
criminally polluting the air and seeks $1,000,000 in exchange for her silence. She may
deserve some amount of compensation (if she lives near the smokestack herself), but she
has "stolen" money that belongs to the state. Id. at 714-15.
90. See Berman, supra note 10, at 823-24 (criticizing Lindgren's argument and citing
other critics).
91. Lindgren, supra note 42, at 715.
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injury and then settling the case on behalf of the plaintiff, keeping the
settlement money for him or herself, and never even notifying the
plaintiff that the tort occurred or that a claim existed. In a criminal
case, when the witness or even the victim agrees not to contact the
police in exchange for some payment, he or she is gaining something
from the defendant that ought to belong to the state.
But this analogy also points out the fundamental flaw in the
"blackmailer as parasite" justification. In the civil context, a plaintiff
literally gains money from the defendant as a result of the
settlement-money that the plaintiff legally and morally deserves and
is intended to compensate the plaintiff for the harm caused by the
defendant. In a criminal case, the state does not actually gain
anything of monetary value from the defendant. True, it has a right to
punish the defendant, but exercising that right actually costs the state
money. The state's interest in learning about and pursuing the
criminal case is not financial (as it is for a civil plaintiff); it is to
further the goals of the criminal justice system: making him suffer for
the crime that he already committed (from a retributivist standpoint)
and deterring the defendant from committing more crimes (from a
utilitarian standpoint). When a third party-the victim or a witness-
supplants the state in a criminal case, he or she is furthering those
same goals by extracting something of value from the perpetrator, or
by requiring the perpetrator to do something he does not want to do.
Granted, the third party will not impose the exact same punishment
as the state would if the case were reported (in fact, by definition the
punishment will be less), but as discussed earlier, this is no different
from traditional plea bargaining: the state pays less (in this case
nothing), and the defendant is deterred less and punished less
severely. Whether it is worth it to reduce the punishment so
drastically in exchange for dropping the cost imposed on the state to
zero is an empirical question-one already discussed in the context of
the utilitarian justifications.9 2
It is true that the third party is (probably) not doing this out of a
sense of justice-perhaps he or she is doing it out of pure greed-but
why would the state (who is the alleged victim of this
92. See supra Part II.B. Professor Brown also sets forth a version of this argument,
noting that there is not necessarily a "disjunction" between the interests of the state and
the interests of the blackmailer. See Brown, supra note 10, at 1963-65. Brown argues that
"the blackmailer 'appropriates' the state's leverage but also creates some deterrence value
that inures to the benefit of the general public.... [I]n the absence of a reporting
requirement, the public might benefit more from incriminating information if blackmail is
allowed." Id. at 1965.
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"misappropriation" under this theory) care about the third party's
motives? In short, the analogy to civil cases is misleading. Nothing is
actually being "stolen" from the state; rather, the third party is
advancing the state's goals (at least part of the way) and saving the
state money.
3. The Blameworthy Actor
Perhaps the most compelling argument for criminalizing
blackmail comes from Professor Mitchell Berman, who proposes an
"evidentiary theory" of blackmail.93 Under Berman's theory, one
sufficient set of criteria for criminalizing any action is that the act (1)
tends to cause or threaten identifiable harm, and (2) is undertaken by
a morally blameworthy actor.94 By adding the second criterion,
Berman resolves the paradox of blackmail. If B discloses an
embarrassing fact about A, then B causes identifiable harm to A-in
reputation, if not financially-but B may or may not be disclosing as a
morally blameworthy actor. B may be disclosing the fact because B
believes it is important for the world to know the truth, or because B
is a friend of the person he is disclosing to and wants her to know the
information. Likewise, if B keeps the information secret, B may be
causing harm-there may be a spouse or employer who remains
deceived and makes poor decisions as a result of the deception. In the
context of private plea bargains-incriminating blackmail-B's
silence will prevent a perpetrator from being brought to justice. But
once again, we have no way of knowing why B remained silent-B
might have been afraid to come forward, or might be a good friend of
A and selflessly not wish to harm A. Thus, under Berman's scheme, it
would be unfair to punish B under either scenario-whether B
disclosed or not.95
93. Berman, supra note 10, at 833-52.
94. Id. at 836. Berman actually creates an entire scheme for deciding what conduct
should be criminalized in a liberal society, and creates three separate criteria for
criminalization. He argues that conduct should be made criminal if:
(1) it is likely in the aggregate to yield net adverse social consequences (taking into
account the costs imposed by the ban itself); (2) it (a) tends to cause or threaten
identifiable harm and (b) is morally wrongful in itself; or (3) it tends both (a) to
cause or threaten identifiable harm, and (b) to be undertaken by a morally
blameworthy actor.
Id. Since Berman believes consequentialist arguments against blackmail fail, and because
there is no way to prove the act is morally wrongful in itself, he rejects (1) and (2) as
justifications for its criminalization. Id. at 837.
95. Id. at 843-44.
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However, if B threatens to disclose the information in a way that
will damage A unless A gives B some consideration, we can now
assume B's motives are morally blameworthy. The circumstances of
the blackmail make B's motives clear. As Berman puts it, "[A]
reasonable fact-finder could infer with confidence sufficient for
purposes of criminalization that if B carried out his threat he would
be engaging in harm-causing conduct with bad motives ....
Berman's evidentiary theory sufficiently resolves the blackmail
paradox, as it provides a principled way to explain why two legal
actions-withholding information and agreeing to carry out a legal
act-become illegal when combined together. Berman even discusses
the specific case of incriminatory blackmail' and concludes that it fits
perfectly within his model.98 An individual might fail to disclose a
crime out of fear or loyalty, but we can infer from the very fact of the
blackmail demand that an individual who threatens to disclose a
crime unless payment is made is motivated by "pure selfishness." 99
But in order to justify criminalizing incriminating blackmail using
Berman's theory, one must make two assumptions, neither of which is
self-evident."0 First, we have to agree that a person's motive should
be relevant in determining whether or not an action is criminal.
Second, we must assume that when the victim or witness demands
something of the perpetrator in exchange for not calling the
authorities, the act of blackmail itself triggers an evidentiary
presumption that the blackmailer is acting with a "bad" motivation.
The first assumption is, at the very least, controversial-as
Berman himself admits, it is contrary to the general rule that "motive
is immaterial in the substantive criminal law.""o' Berman does little to
defend himself against this point, merely stating that motive is
relevant in some specific criminal contexts, such as euthanasia,
justification defenses, and determining punishment.102 These are,
however, narrow exceptions to a very broad and well-established rule.
96. Id. at 848.
97. Id. at 860 (referring to this type of blackmail as "crime exposure blackmail").
98. Id. at 860-63 (stating that the "crime exposure blackmail" case fits within his
evidentiary theory and concluding that "crime exposure blackmail" should be a crime, one
more serious than misprision of felony).
99. Id. at 862.
100. See id. at 860-62, 872 (stating that it can be inferred that the motive of a person
engaging in "crime exposure blackmail" is acting with a selfish motive while also noting
that motive has substantial relevance in evaluating whether an action is criminal).
101. Id. at 872 (quoting WAYNE R. LEFAVE & AUSTIN W. SCOTr, JR., CRIMINAL LAW
227 (2d ed. 1986)).
102. Id. at 872-73 & n.249.
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Euthanasia defenses are relatively modern and not widely accepted,
for example,103 and the fact that motive is a valid consideration in
determining the proper sentence once liability is established is quite
different from arguing that it is relevant in determining whether
liability exists in the first place. He also engages in a bit of circular
reasoning. First, he concludes that blackmail ought to be illegal
because the act of blackmail demonstrates the bad motive of the
actor. Then, to justify this conclusion, he argues that it must be proper
to consider the motive of the actor since doing so helps to justify the
illegality of blackmail."
But more significantly, Berman's second assumption-that the
very act of incriminatory blackmail proves a "bad" motive on the part
of the blackmailer-is suspect. Simply put, when a person demands
something of the perpetrator in exchange for not calling the
authorities, he or she may not be acting out of "pure selfishness" or
any other improper motive. He or she may be the victim, seeking to
receive compensation for physical, economic, or emotional harm that
was suffered. Or the blackmailer may be an "entrepreneur" who
invested time and money investigating this case and now feels that he
or she deserves compensation for all the work. Are either of these
two motives "morally blameworthy?"
The Model Penal Code appears to acknowledge the possibility
that a blackmailer may not have an improper motive, at least with
respect to a victim-blackmailer. The Code includes a special provision
for incriminatory blackmail, which it calls "compounding," and
creates a defense for the victim-blackmailer if the pecuniary benefit
demanded by the victim "did not exceed an amount which the actor
believed to be due as restitution or indemnification for harm caused
by the offense.""0 s Some state codes also make exceptions for
incriminatory blackmail if the blackmailer was acting in good faith.
Ohio, for example, allows for a victim or a witness to engage in
incriminatory blackmail as long as "the actor's purpose was limited
to ... [c]ompelling another to refrain from misconduct or to desist
103. Currently only three states provide for a euthanasia defense to homicide: Oregon,
Washington, and Montana. See State Laws on Assisted Suicide, PROCON.ORG (Jan. 4,
2010,12:49 PM), http://euthanasia.procon.org/view.resource.php?resourcelD=000132.
104. Berman, supra note 10, at 873.
105. MODEL PENAL CODE § 242.5 (1985) ("A person commits a misdemeanor if he
accepts or agrees to accept any pecuniary benefit in consideration of refraining from
reporting to law enforcement authorities the commission or suspected commission of any
offense or information relating to an offense. It is an affirmative defense to prosecution
under this Section that the pecuniary benefit did not exceed an amount which the actor
believed to be due as restitution or indemnification for harm caused by the offense.").
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from further misconduct ... [or] [p]reventing or redressing a wrong
or injustice . . . ."106
Berman is not convinced. Because we all have a moral duty to
report criminal activity, the failure to do so "tends to bespeak a
disregard for the common good and the concrete interests of actual
and potential victims.""o7 Even a victim who is merely seeking
compensation for the injuries she suffered-someone who would fit
perfectly into the Model Penal Code's defense-is acting with an
improper motive: "[Since] all members of the community have a civic
duty to report crime, then it cannot be morally acceptable for a victim
to offer to ignore her obligation for personal gain-even if that gain is
in some sense compensatory."" In other words, Berman's
justification for criminalizing incriminatory blackmail is contingent
upon the premise that we all have a civic duty to report crime, and it
is morally wrong to fail in that duty in order to pursue one's goals.
Professor Berman acknowledges that moral blameworthiness is a
"nebulous concept"-he says it is comprised of a "conscious
willingness to cause [or risk] harm without adequate moral
justification," or "an unjustifiable failure to appreciate the risks he
creates."" But Berman does not allow for the possibility that the
victim or witness could be serving the public interest in reaching a
private settlement. Although Berman later acknowledges the
possibility of "public interest blackmail""'o which would not be
criminalized-cases where both "the act threatened ... and the
condition demanded ... would serve the same public interest"'1 -he
fails to consider whether incriminatory blackmail could fit into that
category.
In the end, whether Berman's theory can justify criminalizing
private criminal settlements depends not only on accepting the
proposition that motive should be relevant in determining whether an
action is criminal, but also on how one defines "improper motive"
and whether a victim or even a witness is presumptively acting with
an improper motive when he or she receives compensation in
exchange for not reporting a crime. Like most judgments made on
retributive grounds, this may be a question which it is impossible to
objectively resolve, but there is certainly reason to believe that
106. OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 2905.12(C) (LexisNexis 2010).
107. Berman, supra note 10, at 861.
108. Id. at 863.
109. Id. at 839.
110. Id. at 864.
111. Id. at 865.
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Berman's presumption may be overbroad, particularly with respect to
victims of a crime. Consider the following two hypothetical situations:
Sam and Diane are married. Sam has an alcohol problem, and
when he drinks he tends to become verbally abusive toward Diane.
One night his verbal abuse turns into physical abuse, and he hits Diane
in the face with a beer bottle, breaking her cheekbone. Diane goes to
the hospital, but does not call the police and refuses to tell the doctor
how she got injured. When she gets home, she gives Sam an ultimatum:
he must immediately enroll in an alcohol treatment program and he
can never drink again. If he fails to comply with either demand, she
will call the police and report his assault on her.
Timothy is a sixteen-year-old high school student. One day a
teacher catches him spray-painting graffiti on the outside wall of the
school. Timothy has decent grades, and has never been in trouble
before. A criminal conviction will lead to him being suspended from
school and hurt his chances of going to college. Even an arrest will
humiliate him in front of his friends and family. The teacher tells
Timothy that she will refrain from calling the police only if Timothy
buys a can of paint remover, comes to school next Saturday, and cleans
off his own graffiti as well as the rest of the graffiti on the wall.
These examples certainly meet the definition of incriminatory
blackmail, but would we really say that the victim or witness in these
cases is acting with a "morally blameworthy" motive? Are Diane or
the teacher "ignoring their obligations" and failing in their "civic
duty" to report these crimes-and if so, do we really feel a need
under the retributive model to punish them for these omissions?
Even in the case of commercial research blackmail, the "moral
duty" of the blackmailer to report the crime is questionable. Consider
a case in which private investigator Smith is hired by ABC Company
to determine whether a certain employee is stealing corporate funds.
After a week of surveillance and combing through bank records,
Smith reports back to his corporate employer, providing mounds of
evidence that the employee is indeed embezzling money. The
company pays Smith for his work and asks him to keep the results of
his investigation secret, even from the authorities, so that the
company can handle the matter internally. In accepting money for his
work-and in agreeing to abstain from reporting the crime as one of
the conditions of his payment-has Smith acted with morally
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blameworthy motives? Some people would perhaps say yes-
investigator Smith, like every other citizen, has a moral duty to report
every crime he or she discovers to the proper authorities, and in
receiving payment, even in part because of his agreement to remain
silent, he is providing evidence of his improper motive. But many
others would be uncomfortable saying that Smith has committed a
crime in this situation.112
To take this one step further, suppose that XYZ Company hired
investigator Jones for similar work, and after Jones' report, the
company made no request one way or the other about keeping the
information secret. Jones, however, decided on his own not to contact
the authorities because it would be too much of a hassle-he would
have to be interviewed by law enforcement, respond to subpoenas,
and perhaps testify at a trial. Under Berman's analysis, the
investigator in the second scenario is presumably not acting with
blameworthy motives-since his compensation was not in any way
dependent upon his silencell 3-but it is hard to see how Jones' actions
are all that different from Smith's.
In short, the "morally blameworthy motive" justification for
criminalization will not always serve to justify incriminatory
blackmail. Sometimes an individual engaged in incriminatory
blackmail will be acting out of purely selfish motives, sometimes he or
she will be trying to repair the damage from the crime, and sometimes
he or she may even have the perpetrator's best interest at heart.
Determining the motive of an actor is a tricky thing, and presuming a
specific motive simply from the type of crime that was committed is
bound to lead to inaccuracies-which is one of the reasons why
motive is almost never relevant for criminal liability.114
112. Some would argue that the investigator's actions are morally superior to a pure
commercial research blackmailer because the investigator is remaining silent with the
knowledge and consent-indeed, at the request--of the victim. But as we saw when we
discussed the second retributive justification, the victim's knowledge and consent cannot
be relevant, because the party that truly "deserves" the information is the state, which has
still not been informed of the crime. See supra Part II.C.2.
113. See Berman, supra note 10, at 861-62. If Berman claimed that avoiding the time
and inconvenience of getting involved as a "morally blameworthy motive," he would be
criminalizing the conduct (or nonconduct) of an enormous number of nonreporting
witnesses by equating their conduct with extortion.
114. There is another, related problem with Berman's theory. He argues that blackmail
should be criminalized because it both tends to (1) "cause or threaten identifiable harm"
and (2) "be undertaken by a morally blameworthy actor." Id. at 836. He then assumes that
incriminatory blackmail causes harm because "[i]t hampers efforts to punish and deter
crime, and ... can be a but for cause of the criminal's future crimes." Id. at 861. But as we
saw when we discussed the utilitarian justifications, the blackmailer may in fact be serving
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D. Using Blackmail Theory to Justify Criminalizing Private Criminal
Settlements
In summary, the utilitarian and retributive justifications for
criminalizing incriminating blackmail are not very strong. In fact,
incriminatory blackmail offers a number of benefits to society. In
many cases, the blackmailer would be unlikely to report the crime
whether or not incriminatory blackmail is an option. For example, if
the witness or victim is a friend, family member, or employer of the
perpetrator, or he or she has engaged in commercial research
blackmail and therefore would not even have known about the crime
if not for the incentive provided by the potential blackmail payoff,
then the crime could nonetheless go unreported. Thus, allowing
incriminatory blackmail imposes some punishment onto the
perpetrator (a punishment he would not otherwise suffer) and-in
the cases where the victim participates in the agreement-a rough
sort of restitution.
There are only two dangers that may arise from allowing private
criminal settlements: first, that the blackmailer will become an
accomplice after the fact and assist with covering up the crime;"' and
second, that the blackmailer may be violating a moral or statutory
duty to report the crime.116 But lawmakers could address these
potential dangers easily enough. The danger of the blackmailer
becoming an after-the-fact accomplice could be solved in two ways:
by increasing the punishments (and thus the deterrence level) for
actively concealing criminal activity; and by banning ongoing,
continuing requests from the blackmailer-that is, by only allowing
the blackmailer to make a single demand of the perpetrator. This
would remove any incentive on the part of the blackmailer to help the
perpetrator avoid detection. Lawmakers can avoid the second risk by
criminalizing any attempt to blackmail using incriminating
information if the blackmailer has a statutory duty to report the crime
in question-for example, if a police officer attempts to blackmail a
suspect instead of arresting him, or if a mandatory reporter sees
evidence of child abuse and uses the evidence to blackmail the
perpetrator.
the public interest by achieving some level of punishment and deterrence at no cost to the
state. See supra Part II.B.1. Thus, on balance the blackmailer may not be causing or
threatening any identifiable harm.
115. See supra notes 67-70 and accompanying text.
116. See supra notes 85-87 and accompanying text.
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But as noted above, blackmail theories are only one possible lens
through which one might analyze private criminal agreements. They
can also be thought of as a private analogue to another aspect of our
criminal justice system, one which (though legal) is almost as
controversial as blackmail: plea bargains. When we examine private
criminal settlements as a private form of plea bargaining, the true
costs and risks of these arrangements become clear.
III. PRIVATE CRIMINAL SETTLEMENTS AS "PRIVATE PLEA
BARGAINS"
The existing literature on plea bargaining provides useful insight
into the costs and benefits of private criminal settlements. Plea
bargaining has a large number of passionate critics" and many of the
criticisms apply, with even greater weight, to the process of private
criminal settlements. Plea bargaining also has a smaller number of
(somewhat less passionate) supporters,"' and some of their
arguments about the benefits of plea bargaining (the saving of
resources, the increased flexibility)"'9 also apply to private criminal
settlements. But the two settlement procedures-plea bargains and
private criminal settlements-are significantly different in a number
of ways. Private criminal settlements may provide some benefits, such
as preserving existing relationships between the victim and
perpetrator, that plea bargaining cannot offer. More importantly,
117. One of the most passionate critics of the plea bargaining process is Professor
Albert Alschuler. See, e.g., Albert W. Alschuler, The Trial Judge's Role in Plea
Bargaining, Part I, 76 COLUM. L. REV. 1059, 1141-42 (1976) [hereinafter Alschuler, Trial
Judge's Role] (characterizing plea bargaining as an "impediment to the effective operation
of the criminal justice system" and a "deliberate mislabeling of offenses"). Professor
Alschuler has written at least seven articles attacking the process of plea bargaining; for a
summary of his critiques, see Albert W. Alschuler, Implementing the Criminal Defendant's
Right to Trial: Alternatives to the Plea Bargaining System, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 931, 931-34
(1983) [hereinafter Alschuler, Right to Trial]. He concludes that "an effort to describe
comprehensively the evils that plea bargaining has wrought requires an extensive tour of
the criminal justice system." Id. at 934; see also John H. Langbein, Torture and Plea
Bargaining, 46 U. CHI. L. REV. 3, 18 (1978) (analogizing plea bargaining to medieval
torture); Stephen J. Schulhofer, Is Plea Bargaining Inevitable?, 97 HARV. L. REV. 1037,
1106 (1984) (arguing that plea bargaining short-circuits the adversarial system).
118. See, e.g., Lynch, supra note 14, at 2136-41 (arguing that plea bargaining allows
prosecutors to exercise necessary discretion); Robert E. Scott & William J. Stuntz, Plea
Bargaining as Contract, 101 YALE L.J. 1909, 1915 (1992) (arguing that if defendants truly
have the right to a jury and other procedural trial rights, they should have the ability to
trade these rights away in exchange for the consideration of a lower sentence).
119. See, e.g., Frank H. Easterbrook, Criminal Procedure as a Market System, 12 J.
LEGAL STUD. 289, 297 (1983) (noting that both parties save resources by agreeing to a
plea bargain).
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however, the biggest benefit of plea bargaining-that it allows the
prosecutor more freedom to exercise her discretion and seek
justicel2 0-is absent from the private criminal settlement context. It is
ultimately this consideration that justifies criminalizing most forms of
private criminal settlements.
Therefore, in analyzing the costs and benefits of private criminal
settlements, Part III will examine both their similarities with public
plea bargains, and the ways in which the private nature of these
agreements makes them unique. But first, we need to discuss whether
it is even legitimate to categorize private criminal settlements as part
of the criminal justice system.
A. Are Private Criminal Settlements Actually "Criminal"?
On the surface, the public plea bargains and private criminal
settlements seem similar. In both situations, the perpetrator is giving
up certain rights in exchange for a lesser punishment. If anything,
private criminal settlements seem like a more extreme version of plea
bargains, since the perpetrator is giving up even more rights than he
does in a public plea bargain, and he is receiving even less
punishment. But this analogy contains a significant flaw: a private
criminal settlement involves the perpetrator and a private party, while
a plea bargain involves the perpetrator and the state.
Many would therefore argue that no agreement between two
private parties could be termed a "criminal" settlement. On one level,
this is purely a question of semantics: certainly one could conceive of
a definition of criminal activity as behavior that elicits a response
from the state, but this is a fairly narrow definition. If an individual
shoplifts, trespasses, or assaults someone, then he has committed a
crime whether the state knows about it or not. And if private parties
reach an agreement and resolve the dispute, then the criminal justice
system has been affected. Consequently, how society regulates or
controls these agreements will also affect the criminal justice
system.'21
But on a deeper level, the distinction between public plea
bargains and private criminal settlements is quite significant: even if
120. See Lynch, supra note 14, at 2129-36 (describing the prosecutor's role in plea
bargaining).
121. I have argued elsewhere that the public criminal justice system has become so
overly politicized and centralized that it has lost a certain amount of legitimacy, and thus
in some ways private settlements of criminal disputes are more legitimate than state-
sponsored resolutions. See Simmons, supra note 13, at 968-69.
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the private agreements could be construed as "criminal" in some
sense, at least one commentator argues that a private criminal
settlement is an inappropriate substitute for the public criminal
justice system because the former lacks the official sanction and
condemnation of the state.122 Criminal activity is traditionally defined
as "conduct which, if duly shown to have taken place, will incur a
formal and solemn pronouncement of the moral condemnation of the
community."123 A criminal conviction from the state properly brings
with it a unique stigma, intended to make the criminal feel shame and
remorse. In a recent article, Professor Kenworthy Bilz explored the
question of why victims are so eager to "delegate their revenge" to
the state and concluded that the formal, official pronouncement of
guilt by the state is a valuable commodity that taxpayers and victims
are willing to pay quite dearly for in terms of time, money, and
inconvenience.124
This type of formal moral condemnation is most evident when a
jury of twelve citizens reaches a guilty verdict after being presented
with the evidence. It is somewhat less powerful when the criminal
conviction resulted from a deal cut between the prosecutor and
defense attorney. Granted, the state is still making a formal
declaration of criminal liability, but without a formal adjudication,
without the victims and witness taking the stand and facing the
defendant, and without the full participation of a judge and/or jury in
determining guilt. A plea bargained conviction does not carry with it
the same level of solemn condemnation. 125 For many misdemeanors, a
prosecutor will be willing to bargain away criminal liability
completely-offering a noncriminal violation or even dropping the
122. See Brown, supra note 10, at 1970-71.
123. Henry M. Hart, Jr., The Aims of the Criminal Law, 23 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS.
401, 405 (1958).
124. Kenworthey Bilz, The Puzzle of Delegated Revenge, 87 B.U. L. REV. 1059, 1076-
85 (2007).
125. Professor Bilz acknowledges that the public aspect of a trial is critical to the sense
of a formal condemnation. Id. at 1076-77. At one point she quotes a British editorial
writer who states that:
Justice by pub-talk or lynchmob is summary and brutal, but it is not real justice,
for it lacks the intellectual satisfaction of evidence adduced and weighed, and it is
empty of that moral soundness that comes from a decision made by us, as
represented by 12 of our number, affecting the final destiny of the prisoner.
Id. at 1077 (quoting Brian Masters, He Cannot Be Allowed To Escape Justice, DAILY
MAIL (London), June 11, 2003, at 12). A plea bargain simply does not provide the same
level of "intellectual satisfaction" or "moral soundness" as a public trial.
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charges completely if the defendant agrees to enter a treatment
program or reimburse the victim.
In this sense, the public plea bargain resembles a private criminal
settlement. The public plea bargain short-circuits the traditional path
of criminal adjudication by allowing the defendant to waive certain
rights in exchange for a lower punishment-and perhaps less of a
formal condemnation-while a private criminal settlement asks the
perpetrator to waive even more rights and in return receive an even
lower punishment, including the lack of a formal condemnation. In
this sense, the formal condemnation is merely one more chip on the
bargaining table, and one more unpleasant consequence that the
perpetrator seeks to avoid, thereby increasing the bargaining position
of the victim or other private party who is conducting the settlement.
In other words, the current practice of plea bargaining already
treats the shame and stigma of the criminal conviction as merely one
more element of the punishment that is on the bargaining table in the
plea negotiation. Private criminal settlements are simply another step
down the same path, a way of gaining flexibility and efficiency by
eschewing the formalities of the "traditional" criminal justice system.
Because prosecutors and defendants can already use the plea
bargaining process to potentially barter away all aspects of the
criminal justice system--constitutional rights, incarceration, the
stigma of a criminal conviction-it is hard to argue that any of these
aspects are fundamental and essential parts of the process. Thus, the
difference between public plea bargains and private criminal
settlements is properly seen as one of degree and not of kind.
B. Critiques of Plea Bargaining
Academic criticism of plea bargaining is widespread and
spirited.126 It is possible to distill the critiques into four different
categories which are particularly pertinent to the question of private
criminal settlements: (1) plea bargaining results in a lack of
transparency; 127 (2) plea bargaining will lead to inequality in result
based on income;128 (3) plea bargaining can become coercive,
resulting in innocent defendants pleading guilty;129 and (4) the results
126. See supra note 117.
127. See Alschuler, Trial Judge's Role, supra note 117, at 1141-42; Brown, supra note
10, at 1974.
128. See, e.g., Lynch, supra note 14, at 2123 (noting that poorer defendants may end up
with less favorable plea bargains, but also arguing that income disparity results in
inequality for cases that go to trial).
129. See, e.g., Albert W. Alschuler, The Changing Plea Bargaining Debate, 69 CALIF. L.
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of plea bargaining do not accurately simulate the results which would
occur at trial.130 As we shall see, most of these criticisms apply with
even more weight to private criminal settlements.
1. Lack of Transparency
Plea bargaining makes the criminal justice system less
transparent in two ways. First, the negotiations are conducted in
private, so criminal cases are resolved in relative secrecy-in contrast
to the constitutionally guaranteed public nature of a criminal trial.
Second, the ultimate disposition of a case is frequently misleading: a
defendant will frequently agree to plead to a charge that is less severe
than (and perhaps completely unrelated to) what he was actually
charged with-and thus his criminal record will not be an accurate
record of his actual criminal conduct.131
Unlike other rights which the defendant waives in exchange for
his plea bargain, the right to a public trial does not belong exclusively
to the defendant. Thus, resolving the case in secret affects society as a
whole, not just the defendant. In a full-fledged trial, the judge can
monitor both sides to ensure fairness in the proceedings, the public
can monitor the judge and both parties, and a record is made which
can be consulted in the case of an appeal. None of these apply in the
plea bargaining context, so that abuses by either side go unchecked
and unnoticed, unless one of the attorneys brings it to the attention of
the court. More broadly, secrecy in the process threatens the integrity
of the entire system, decreasing its legitimacy in the eyes of lay
people.132
The need for transparency in the labeling of convictions is a bit
more subtle. Professor Albert Alschuler notes that correctional
facilities rely on the name of the crime when classifying prisoners and
setting parole dates, and the "mislabeling" of the crimes makes this
less efficient.13 A greater problem arises later in the process, when a
REV. 652, 713-16 (1981); Douglas G. Gifford, Meaningful Reform of Plea Bargaining: The
Control of Prosecutorial Discretion, 1983 U. ILL. L. REV. 37, 58-61; Kenneth Kipnis,
Criminal Justice and the Negotiated Plea, 86 ETHICS 93, 97-99 (1976); Scott & Stuntz,
supra note 118, at 1948.
130. See Stephanos Bibas, Plea Bargaining Outside the Shadow of Trial, 117 HARV. L.
REV. 2464,2467-68 (2004).
131. See Alschuler, Trial Judge's Role, supra note 117, at 1141-42.
132. See Brown, supra note 10, at 1974 ("The fear is not that [incriminatory] blackmail
precludes public justice or reduces the quantity of public involvement. Rather, the concern
is that we fundamentally alter the quality of justice when we take enforcement away from
a public audience.").
133. See Alschuler, Trial Judge's Role, supra note 117, at 1142. Professor Alschuler also
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defendant is arrested and convicted for a new crime, and the judge
(or prosecutor, in a plea bargaining situation) is attempting to
determine the appropriate sentence for the new crime. A defendant's
prior criminal record is perhaps the most important factor in
determining what sentence is appropriate, and past plea bargaining
can disguise the actual nature of much of the defendant's prior
conduct. For example, a defendant who has committed three acts of
domestic violence in the past may have a criminal record of three
disorderly conducts, and the prosecutor or judge seeking to set an
appropriate sentence for the fourth domestic violence conviction will
be acting with imperfect information.'34
These critiques apply with even greater force to private criminal
settlements. The parties conduct the negotiation and private
resolution even further from the public eye, so that there is no way to
monitor for abuses and no reason for anyone to believe that the
process is fair and impartial.'35 Those who are inexperienced with the
criminal justice system are more likely to be abused, especially if the
party with whom they are negotiating is a repeat player. For example,
if a first-time shoplifter is apprehended by an experienced store
security guard, the guard could employ bullying and other
inappropriate tactics to unfairly influence the perpetrator. Unlike
potential reforms of the plea bargaining process, such as requiring a
judge to more critically examine the completed deals that the parties
bring to the court, there is no feasible way to regulate private criminal
settlements to make them more open and make the parties more
accountable. For the parties, this may be one of the benefits to the
process-both the victim/witness and the perpetrator might prefer not
to be involved in a public process. However, for the criminal justice
system as a whole, the secrecy of the process detracts from its
legitimacy.
notes that mislabeling can make it difficult for a court or a defendant to determine
whether a defendant has been convicted of a crime that has later been found to be
unconstitutional, and that mislabeling the crimes "may encourage a belief in the hypocrisy
of the guilty plea system." Id. at 1141-42.
134. I say imperfect information rather than misleading information because the
prosecutor or judge almost certainly knows enough about the system to realize that past
convictions are not always what they seem, and can take that into account when reviewing
a criminal record littered with arrests for certain conduct and guilty pleas for different
conduct.
135. See Brown, supra note 10, at 1974 ("[Incriminatory blackmail] involves no public
review of the facts or interpretation of the law. It transfers an otherwise public process to a
private venue where records are sealed and results are inaccessible.").
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Similarly, the defendant's criminal record is completely
unaffected by a private criminal settlement, so a prosecutor or judge
in a future case will not have any hint as to the nature of the
defendant's previous criminal activity-or even that he committed a
crime at all. This could lead to dramatically different treatment
between criminals who were able to settle their previous criminal
disputes privately and those who could not.
Of course, this is one of the factors that make the private
criminal settlement so appealing to the perpetrator in the first place;
avoiding a criminal record is one of the intangible benefits he derives
from making a deal with the private actor. By agreeing to a private
settlement, the perpetrator not only lessens his punishment on this
occasion, but he also lessens his punishment for the next crime or
crimes that he commits. In other words, this secrecy gives the parties
even more room to negotiate, further increasing the incentives to
enter into these agreements.
2. Inequality Based on Income
Another critique of the plea bargaining system is that it creates
disparities based on the economic class of the defendant. 136 Plea
bargaining allegedly does this in two ways. First, those who can afford
a good lawyer can negotiate a better deal with the prosecutor, if only
by filing more motions, requesting more hearings, and generally
making the litigation longer and thus more expensive for the
prosecutor-which should, under the logic of plea bargaining, result
in a prosecutor more willing to deal. Second, and far more
importantly, defendants who are able to post bail fare much better
than those who cannot. Defendants who are held in jail pending trial
are far less able to participate in their defense, and far more willing to
plead (especially in misdemeanor cases, where the time spent in jail
awaiting trial may begin to approach the maximum sentence for the
crime charged).
It is debatable whether this critique of plea bargaining is well
taken, however. Good lawyers will certainly help a defendant get a
better plea bargain, but they will just as certainly help the defendant's
chances at trial as well, 137 and it is not clear whether the disparity is
greater for plea bargains than for trials.' Likewise, the problem of
136. See Lynch, supra note 14, at 2123.
137. Id.
138. In fact, one could argue that public defenders-who cost nothing-are the most
skilled plea bargainers of all, since they are repeat players in the system and know exactly
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pretrial detention leading to a coercive plea is more of a critique of
pretrial detention than of plea bargaining itself.
However one resolves this dispute with regard to public plea
bargains, it seems at first glance that disparity based on income
inequality is a far greater problem for private criminal settlements. In
fact, the effect of income disparity may be the primary objection that
most individuals have to allowing such agreements. Allowing the
privately wealthy to buy their way out of criminal liability might
result in one type of justice for the rich, who can pay off their victims
and avoid even the inconvenience of an arrest, and another type of
justice for the poor, who will be unable to strike a deal and will
inevitably end up in the public system, incarcerated and burdened
with a criminal record.
Upon closer analysis, however, the dynamic between income and
disposition in a private criminal settlement is a bit more complex.
First of all, it is not clear that less wealthy perpetrators would be
unable to reach a private agreement. As noted above, many
victims/witnesses receive very little benefit (or even suffer costs)
when they report the crime to the police and would potentially be
willing to accept a very small amount of consideration in exchange for
their promise not to report the crime.139 And the consideration given
by the perpetrator need not be monetary-as noted in some of the
hypothetical cases described earlier, it could be a promise not to
engage in certain activity, or to stay away from a certain commercial
establishment, or to perform some service. These low cost or
nonmonetary amounts are likely common for less severe crimes,
which likely make up the bulk of crimes that are resolved by private
criminal settlements.
In fact, if private criminal settlements were to become more
widespread, it is likely that wealthy perpetrators would face harsher
consequences than their less wealthy counterparts. A wealthy
individual faces greater opportunity costs if arrested and incarcerated,
and would therefore be willing to pay more money than someone less
wealthy in order to avoid criminal liability. Even more important,
however, would be the increased enforcement that would occur
against wealthy criminals. If private criminal settlements were to be
allowed, one could imagine private individuals or companies
conducting their own investigations into criminal activity for profit-
what each case is "worth" in the system.
139. See supra Part I.C.1.
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what we earlier termed "commercial research" blackmail.14 These
private parties would surely target the wealthier members of society,
investigating every possible indiscretion on their part in order to
determine whether criminal activity has occurred.'41 Granted, these
individuals will be able to pay money in order to avoid arrest,
incarceration, and a criminal record-but if the private party never
had the incentive to investigate the conduct in the first place, then the
perpetrator would never have been detected at all. Thus, it is
certainly possible that wealthy individuals will be punished more
often, and thus deterred more effectively, if private criminal
settlements were to become widespread.
3. Plea Bargaining Leads to Wrongful Convictions
One of the most powerful critiques of plea bargaining is that it
can lead to innocent defendants pleading guilty. There are a number
of variants to this argument. Some commentators argue that plea
bargaining is coercive, since the defendant faces such a severe
sentence if he does not agree to the deal that even an innocent
defendant may feel forced into taking the plea.'42 Others argue that a
defendant offered a plea bargain will make his decision based not on
whether he is guilty or innocent, but on his level of risk aversion-and
since innocent defendants are likely to be more risk averse than guilty
ones, the plea bargaining process leads to more innocent convictions
than the trial process would.14 3
Of course, trials can and do occasionally result in the conviction
of an innocent person, and there is no way to know which method in
140. See supra note 40 and accompanying text.
141. Professor Steven Shavell made a similar point when discussing the possibility of
allowing police officers to profit from collecting what he calls "privately arranged
bounties" when making arrests. See Shavell, supra note 42, at 1901. He criticized this idea
because the police would spend a disproportionate amount of resources on investigating
wealthy suspects; thus "a poor murderer would not be sought after since he could not pay
much, whereas a wealthy man who got involved in a brawl would be a prime target." Id.
As noted above in the text accompanying notes 84-85, since police officers have a duty to
report (and act on) criminal activity, they should not be permitted to engage in private
criminal settlements under any circumstances.
142. See, e.g., Alschuler, supra note 129, at 713-16; Gifford, supra note 129, at 58-61;
Kipnis, supra note 129, at 97-99.
143. See, e.g., Scott & Stuntz, supra note 118, at 1948 ("Innocent defendants are
probably highly risk averse relative to guilty defendants .... In other words, due in part to
adjudication costs, the risk from going to trial is likely to be substantial, not because the
probabilities of conviction are altered, but because the impact of conviction is so great.
Risk averse defendants, meaning in part innocent ones, might well avoid that risk even at
the cost of accepting a deal that treats them as if they were certain to be convicted at
trial.") (footnote omitted).
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fact leads to a greater percentage of false convictions. But
fundamentally, this critique is not based on the numbers of false
convictions; instead, it focuses on the very nature of the plea
bargaining process. Because the defendant has so much to lose
merely by going to trial, even if the case against him is weak, there is
almost always some offer that the prosecutor can make which will be
more attractive than the prospect of going to trial and would
therefore induce the defendant to plead guilty-even if he is in fact
innocent. As one commentator puts it:
[Prosecutors] merely have to offer each defendant a settlement
he prefers to trial. Only very rarely is the highest acceptable
sentence of a defendant zero; in fact many innocent defendants
are willing to accept minor punishment in return for avoiding
the risk of a much harsher trial result. Therefore, prosecutors
can extract guilty pleas even from defendants who are likely to
be found not guilty at trial.1"
This problem is only exacerbated in the context of private
criminal settlements, since a defendant has so much more to lose by
not reaching an agreement. In other words, the very same factors
which make a private criminal settlement so attractive will also
increase the likelihood that an innocent defendant will agree to pay
some consideration in exchange for not having to become involved in
the system. In the plea bargaining context, a defendant knows that
the alternative to a negotiated settlement is undesirable only if a
prosecutor can convince a jury of his guilt beyond a reasonable
doubt-a very high standard, and one that many innocent defendants
might be willing to gamble on. In the private criminal settlement
context, the perpetrator's alternative to a negotiated settlement is
undesirable if the witness or victim can convince a police officer that
there is probable cause to make an arrest-a much lower standard
that even innocent defendants may not care to test.
On the other hand, the consequences of an innocent person
agreeing to a private criminal settlement are far less severe than when
an innocent person accepts a plea bargain, since in the former case,
the accused does not end up with a criminal conviction. In fact,
private criminal settlements provide a valuable opportunity for an
innocent person who is accused of a crime. In the absence of a private
criminal settlement, if the accused cannot convince the victim/witness
144. Oren Gazal-Ayal, Partial Ban on Plea Bargains, 27 CARDOZO L. REV. 2295,
2304-05 (2006) (footnotes omitted).
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of his innocence, then the likely result is arrest and the very real
possibility of a criminal conviction. In effect, the chance to agree to a
private criminal settlement could prevent an innocent person from
being convicted.
4. Plea Bargains Do Not Accurately Simulate Results from Trials
Defenders of plea bargains frequently respond to these first
three criticisms by arguing that plea bargaining is a voluntary process,
so the defendant is perfectly free to reject the agreement and go to
trial. The same response applies with regard to private criminal
settlements-by their nature, these settlements are voluntary, and so
if a defendant is not satisfied with the offer, he can call the other
party's bluff and take his chances in the public criminal justice system.
This argument, however, rests on a fundamental assumption
which may not be true: that private criminal settlements and plea
bargains take place in the shadow of the law, and therefore the results
from these agreements are similar to the results from a public trial
(minus some discount, of course, in exchange for the perpetrator
admitting responsibility). Once again, the literature on plea
bargaining is a rich source of analysis on this question. Commentators
have debated this issue for decades in the plea bargaining context,
since it directly affects the desirability of plea bargaining. If the plea
bargaining process is indeed a reasonable replacement for a trial, then
plea bargaining should be encouraged, since it can achieve the same
result with far fewer resources. 145 On the other hand, if the results are
dependent on factors unrelated to what would occur at trial, then
society should work to reform, limit, or abolish the practice.146
The idea that plea bargains mostly reflect what would happen at
trial is perhaps best identified with Judge Frank Easterbrook,14 7
although others have endorsed the model as well.148 The essential
argument is as follows: Both prosecutors and defense attorneys are
repeat players in the system, and so they both have a good idea as to
145. See, e.g., Thomas W. Church, Jr., In Defense of "Bargain Justice," 13 LAW &
Soc'Y REV. 509,523 (1979).
146. See, e.g., Stephen J. Schulhofer, Criminal Justice Discretion as a Regulatory
System, 17 J. LEGAL STUD. 43,49-60 (1988).
147. See Easterbrook, supra note 119, at 289 (arguing that plea bargaining is an
element "of a well-functioning market system"); Frank H. Easterbrook, Plea Bargaining
as Compromise, 101 YALE L.J. 1969, 1972 (1992).
148. See, e.g., Church, supra note 145, at 537; William M. Landes, An Economic
Analysis of the Courts, 14 J.L. & ECON. 61, 61 (1971); Scott & Stuntz, supra note 118, at
1910-11 (arguing that plea bargaining is generally a fair outcome for trials but suggesting
certain reforms to prevent the conviction of innocent defendants).
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what would happen if the case went to trial-both with regard to the
chances of conviction and the likely sentence. Thus, they are able to
bargain within a relatively narrow range to reach a result which is
more or less equivalent to what would happen at trial, discounted by
the possibility of acquittal and discounted again in exchange for the
defendant's willingness to forgo his right to trial and thereby save the
state time and money. For example, if the defendant has a ninety
percent chance of being convicted of a crime, and the crime carries an
average sentence of ten years, he might be offered a plea deal of six
years: nine years as an approximation of the result at trial, minus
three years in exchange for saving the state the resources of going to
trial. Under this theory, the attorneys use the handful of trials that do
occur as the standard to guide the hundreds or thousands of plea
bargains which they strike-much like real estate appraisers use
actual sales of neighboring houses to estimate the value of a specific
property. Plea bargains are therefore a relatively efficient method of
disposing of cases-the state gets almost the same amount of justice,
having to settle for slightly lower sentences in exchange for the time
and money that is saved. Under this model, giving the defendants
more procedural rights-a more robust Miranda right, for example,
or more extensive discovery rights-is in reality simply giving the
defendant more to bargain away, effectively lowering the ultimate
sentence.
Of course, Judge Easterbrook's contract theory of plea
bargaining rests upon the assumption that the attorneys who are
bargaining are veterans of the criminal justice system who can easily
determine (and agree upon) the expected result at trial. In criminal
law, this is generally a valid assumption, since most defense attorneys
and all prosecutors are repeat players, or at the very least have an
opportunity to consult with more experienced colleagues.
More fundamentally, however, commentators have attacked the
contract theory for ignoring agency costs in plea bargaining.149
Prosecutors and defense attorneys have other, more personal
incentives when they engage in plea bargaining, which could tend to
149. See Albert W. Alschuler, The Prosecutor's Role in Plea Bargaining, 36 U. CHI. L.
REV. 50, 54-55 (1968) (discussing the volume of indictments in Cook County Circuit
Court and the pressure put on prosecutors to move cases quickly); Bibas, supra note 130,
at 2477 (discussing attorneys' inconsistent incentives at plea bargaining depending on how
the attorney is being compensated); Darryl K. Brown, Rationing Criminal Defense
Entitlements: An Argument from Institutional Design, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 801, 812 (2004)
(pointing out that courts and lawyers have incentives to dispose of cases as expeditiously
as possible).
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skew the outcome of the plea bargain far from what might happen at
trial. Prosecutors might be willing to give too deep a discount because
they wish to reduce their workload, or because they are afraid of
losing a case at trial.1so Defense attorneys might be overburdened and
underresourced, and may enjoy close relationships with the judges
and the prosecutors which they do not want to jeopardize with
aggressive bargaining tactics.15 1 To make matters worse, these agency
costs vary from case to case based on factors which are completely
unrelated to the goals of justice or even to what might happen at trial.
Some prosecutors may have political ambitions and be more risk
averse than others, while some private defense attorneys may be
much more willing to go to trial than their state-funded
counterparts.152
Recently, Professor Stephanos Bibas launched an even broader
attack on the contract model of plea bargaining (which he calls the
"shadow-of-trial" model).' In addition to arguing that the agency
costs are far more significant than other commentators are willing to
acknowledge, Professor Bibas also examines psychological factors
which tend to skew the results of plea bargaining. 154 He concludes that
there are four "structural and psychological forces" which influence
plea bargaining: uncertainty, self-interest, money, and demographic
variation,5 5 and he proposes a number of structural changes to
reform the plea bargaining process to align its results more closely
with those of a trial.
First, uncertainty on behalf of both parties leads to many
psychological pitfalls: overconfidence and risk taking in some cases,
and risk aversion and anchoring in others. The two primary remedies
that Professor Bibas proposes to combat the pitfalls from uncertainty
are liberalized discovery rules, to be enforced before the plea
bargaining takes effect, and more determinant sentencing regimes.156
The problem of self-interest is somewhat trickier. It is closely related
to the agency costs discussed earlier, in that both prosecutors and
defense attorneys have their own personal goals and motivations
150. See Alschuler, supra note 149, at 54-55.
151. See Brown, supra note 149, at 812.
152. See Bibas, supra note 130, at 2477.
153. Id. at 2465.
154. Bibas mentions overconfidence, self-serving biases, denial mechanisms,
discounting future costs, loss aversion, risk preferences, framing, and anchoring. Id. at
2496-2519.
155. Id. at 2528.
156. Id. at 2531-34.
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beyond what is best for their clients, but it also means something
more-defendants will act in irrational ways during the plea
bargaining session, and attorneys must work to debias them and
overcome their denial of the risk or overconfidence. 157 Professor
Bibas suggests taking steps to reduce agency costs by supervising the
line prosecutors more carefully, changing the fee structure for defense
attorneys, and giving judges a more active role in reviewing the plea
bargain.18 He also suggests that defense attorneys work harder to
overcome a client's irrational psychological biases.'s
The other two issues Bibas discusses-money and demographic
variation-tend to exacerbate the first two problems. Defendants
with money can hire attorneys with better information, thereby
reducing uncertainty during the bargaining process. These attorneys
may not have the same self-interest to accept an unfairly low offer.16
Demographic variation can also aggravate problems because
variation between different defendants creates a wider range of biases
and irrationalities, sometimes with perverse results. For example,
repeat offenders are likely to be less risk averse, meaning that they
will not take a deal unless the prosecutor offers a steep discount. In
contrast, first-time offenders will be more likely to take a much
harsher deal in order to avoid the potentially severe sentences after
trial."'1
Most of these critiques apply with even greater force in the case
of private criminal settlements. In plea bargaining, both negotiators
are almost always repeat players with legal training and extensive
knowledge of the chances at trial and the expected sentence. But this
is generally not the case in the context of private criminal settlements
because the parties are private citizens, and private citizens who are
negotiating are unlikely to have information pertaining to the
expected outcome at trial. Consequently, the negotiations may lead to
results which are completely unrelated to what might happen at
trial-or even what would happen after a public plea bargain. Even
more troubling is the possibility that one of the private parties (such
as a recidivist criminal or an experienced security guard) has this kind
of information and the other does not, leading to asymmetrical
results.
157. Id. at 2543-44.
158. Id. at 2540-43.
159. Id. at 2540-45.
160. Id. at 2539-40.
161. Id. at 2529-30.
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This lack of information will only increase uncertainty, leading to
a greater level of the psychological biases that Bibas discusses:
overconfidence, risk taking, risk aversion, and anchoring. And
although the parties are negotiating on behalf of themselves, which
should eliminate agency costs, Bibas' problem of self-interest is even
more pronounced. Without defense attorneys present to debias the
perpetrator away from these skewed perceptions, the party will likely
act irrationally.162
Even if the private parties had perfect information, and even if
they were able to overcome the irrationalities inherent in negotiation,
private criminal settlements still may result in sentences that are more
severe than what a perpetrator would receive at trial. For example, if
the perpetrator is charged with a crime that would result in a light
sentence from the public authorities but would be embarrassing to the
perpetrator, such as soliciting a prostitute or indecent exposure, he
may be willing to concede a good amount during the negotiation in
exchange for keeping the incident secret.
C. Benefits of Plea Bargaining and Private Criminal Settlements
Thus, there is ample evidence that the contract model of plea
bargaining is flawed. Contract model theorists would freely
acknowledge that other factors (such as the caseload of the court and
the prosecutor) will also influence the bargain that is struck-the
more overloaded the prosecutors are, the more they will discount
their offer; that is, after all, the entire point of plea bargaining.
Contract model theorists would also acknowledge, perhaps a bit more
grudgingly, that other factors unrelated to the chance of conviction
and possible sentence will affect the offers made and the outcomes
that are reached, but they tend to downplay these other factors.
Opponents of the contract model go much further, arguing that these
other factors are so significant that they overwhelm the "legitimate"
factors, thus rendering plea bargaining illegitimate.163
There are good reasons to believe that private criminal
settlements, even more so than plea bargains, are likely to produce
dispositions that are inconsistent with what would happen at trial. But
162. We have already discussed the effect that the wealth of the perpetrator might have
on private criminal settlements: On the one hand, it may allow wealthier perpetrators to
buy their way out of criminal liability more than their less wealthy counterparts. On the
other hand, if the "commercial research blackmail" form of private settlements were
allowed, it might make the wealthy more likely to be targeted in the first place. See supra
Part III.B.2.
163. See Bibas, supra note 130, at 2470-76.
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perhaps both sides are asking the wrong question by assuming that
the ideal for plea bargaining-or for private criminal settlements-is
to approximate the results at trial. Certainly that is the original goal
of plea bargaining. And there should be a presumption that the
results at trial are the socially optimal results-that is, the results that
are most consistent with our ideals of achieving justice while still
protecting the rights of the defendant.
However, it is possible that plea bargaining does more than
merely increase the efficiency of the criminal justice system: it
provides unique benefits that the traditional adversary trial does not
provide. Traditionally, plea bargaining has been seen as little more
than an inexpensive way of producing rough justice, a process that is
accepted as a necessary evil because the criminal justice system
cannot afford to provide every defendant with a trial. But like other
forms of alternative dispute resolution, plea bargaining creates the
chance for a more creative and flexible resolution to the dispute. By
allowing defendants more input into the process, plea bargaining can
increase the procedural justice in the system. Finally, plea bargaining
allows prosecutors to exercise broad discretion and seek justice in
each individual case.
As in the earlier discussions, this Article will apply the arguments
in favor of plea bargains to private criminal settlements, leading to a
similar but distinct conclusion. Although private criminal settlements
provide even more flexibility than plea bargains, they do not increase
procedural justice or allow prosecutors to exercise discretion. They
do, however, provide one additional benefit not afforded by trials or
plea bargains: the chance of maintaining long-term relationships
between the perpetrator and the victim, leading (perhaps) to a
greater chance of rehabilitation and lower recidivism rates.
1. Flexibility in Reaching a Resolution
One obvious benefit of plea bargaining is that it allows for
greater flexibility in resolving the criminal dispute. When a judge
sentences a defendant after a guilty verdict, the judge is limited by
statutory restrictions as to the sentence that can be imposed. A
prosecutor and a defense attorney who work out a plea bargain,
however, can agree to alter the charge in order to accommodate any
disposition that the two parties agree upon. Thus, if a prosecutor
believes incarceration is inappropriate, he or she can amend the
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charge to a crime which does not carry mandatory jail time.'" If the
crime the defendant committed carries with it a collateral
consequence which is unjust under the particular circumstances of
this case-such as deportation for a legal permanent resident who is a
productive member of society, or lifelong sexual registration for a
juvenile who committed a relatively minor sex crime-the prosecutor
has the power to adjust the charge and allow the defendant to plead
guilty to a different offense. In return, the prosecutor may demand
concessions from the defendant which would be impossible or at least
unlikely after a conviction at trial, such as agreeing to engage in a
specific kind of community service, voluntarily entering counseling,
restitution beyond what is required by law, or cooperation in the
investigation and prosecution of others. None of these arrangements
would be possible without the use of plea bargaining.
Of course, in the criminal law context, flexibility can be both
positive and negative. On the one hand, flexibility may allow the
parties to reach a more just result than would occur if a judge were to
formally follow strictly enforced sentencing guidelines. This is
especially true if one accepts the premise that prosecutors are seeking
to do justice in individual cases, which would mean that allowing
them broad discretion in selecting charges and proposing dispositions
only increases their ability to reach a just result in each case.165 On the
other hand, this kind of flexibility leads to inconsistent results for
identical crimes, even within the same jurisdiction, and consistency is
a key element of fairness, particularly in the context of criminal law.
Furthermore, whenever a prosecutor and a defense attorney become
creative in crafting a resolution specifically for their particular case,
they are ignoring the intent of the legislature, which set out a specific
sentencing range, perhaps including particular collateral
consequences, for a given crime.
For better or for worse, private criminal settlements allow for
even greater flexibility than plea bargains. Although prosecutors have
more freedom to craft dispositions during plea bargaining than judges
do at sentencing, they are still somewhat restricted by the law and by
institutional office policies. Private parties who are settling a criminal
dispute, on the other hand, are free from any institutional limitations
164. A prosecutor may also amend the charge to avoid what she believes is an overly
harsh mandatory sentence. For example, in a three strikes jurisdiction, if the defendant has
two prior felonies, and he commits a burglary which would result in life in prison, the
prosecutor could amend the charge to a misdemeanor in order to avoid the lengthy prison
time that the three strikes law would require.
165. See infra notes 188-91 and accompanying text.
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whatsoever. This enhanced flexibility is one of the reasons why
private criminal settlements are so attractive; if the public authorities
are not involved, the parties can come up with any sort of resolution,
as long as they both agree to it. But while flexibility is potentially a
positive element in the plea bargaining context when one of the
parties is (at least arguably) attempting to reach a just resolution,
there is little reason to believe it leads to a more just result in the case
of private criminal settlements, where each party is simply trying to
maximize gain (or, in the case of the perpetrator, minimize one's
punishment). Instead, the flexibility inherent in private agreements
merely leads to inconsistent results for identical crimes.
This inconsistency problem is only magnified by the secretive
nature of these agreements. Prosecutors and defense attorneys in the
same jurisdiction can, and often do, compare the proposed disposition
of their cases to other cases which have pled out in the past to ensure
that a potential plea agreement is not severely out of line with the
"going rate" for that crime. In contrast, most (though not all)
individual private parties will have no idea how other private parties
have resolved their criminal disputes, and will therefore begin from a
blank slate for every negotiation, resulting in inconsistent results.166
2. Procedural Justice
A second benefit that plea bargaining provides is that it endows
the criminal justice system with a greater amount of "procedural
justice." Psychologists have devoted a significant amount of study to
determining what leads participants to believe that they have been
treated fairly when a dispute is resolved, and they have concluded the
primary factor is not the actual substantive outcome of the case, but
rather whether the individual believed the procedure to be fair.'6 7 This
has led to a field of study that is known as procedural justice. It is a
method of evaluating dispute resolution systems based not on the
substantive outcomes they produce (which is known as "distributive
166. Of course, private criminal settlements can result in consistent results in certain
situations involving repeat players: for example, when a security guard for a specific retail
store catches shoplifters, he or she probably has a standard deal to offer the perpetrator.
Even in these situations, however, there is only a consistency for perpetrators
apprehended by the same repeat players. To take the same example, different stores in the
same jurisdictions would likely have different policies regarding shoplifting.
167. See Tom R. Tyler, Legitimacy and Criminal Justice: The Benefits of Self-
Regulation, 7 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 307, 319-20 (2009) (describing studies of procedural
justice).
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justice"), but instead on whether the individuals who were affected by
the resolution believe the procedure that was used was fair.168
Studies in the field of procedural justice 69 have demonstrated
that there are three factors that determine whether or not an
individual believes that a given procedure is fair.170 The first is known
as "process control," which is the individual's opportunity to
participate in the procedure, whether or not their participation affects
the actual outcome."' The second factor is whether the participant
168. See, e.g., TOM R. TYLER, WHY PEOPLE OBEY THE LAW 74 (1990). Citing six
separate psychological studies, Professor Tyler notes that:
Recent research confirms that people evaluate their experience in procedural
terms. Such procedural effects have been found in trials as well as in other
procedures used to resolve disputes, including plea bargaining, mediation, and
decision making by police officers .... Wherever procedural issues have been
studied they have emerged as an important concern to those affected by the
decisions.
Id. (citations omitted). As Professor Tyler explains, there are two potential reasons for this
focus on process rather than on substance. First, in a complex society, individuals receive a
diverse variety of benefits (from monetary benefits to clean and safe streets) and pay a
similarly diverse variety of costs (from paying taxes to having liberty restricted to a certain
degree). Since it is impossible for any individual to keep track of all the benefits received
and all the costs paid, the individual finds it easier to focus on the procedure itself and
evaluate its fairness. If procedures are generally fair, the individual will conclude that in
the long run he or she will pay and receive a just distribution of costs and benefits. The
second possible explanation is that in a diverse society, individuals may disagree on what
constitutes a just distribution of substantive benefits and costs, but they can generally
agree on what constitutes a fair procedure. Id. at 109.
As will be shown, the preference for a fair and meaningful process over any
specific substantive result has been confirmed in the restorative justice context. As one
restorative justice proponent has noted: "Several studies have consistently found that the
restitution agreement is less important to crime victims than the opportunity to talk
directly with the offender about their feelings regarding the crime." Mark S. Umbreit,
Restorative Justice Through Victim-Offender Mediation: A Multi-Site Assessment, W.
CRIMINOLOGY REV. (June 1998), http://wcr.sonoma.edu/v1n1/umbreit.html (citations
omitted).
169. The name of the discipline is misleading, since the studies are only focused on the
perception of fairness and not the actual fairness of the process. Of course, just because
most victims and defendants believe that restorative justice programs are more fair does
not make them so. Obviously the question of whether the parties involved are in fact
better off is a critical one. But the issue of perceived fairness should not be overlooked
since it is critical to the legitimacy, and therefore to the long-term survival of the criminal
justice system. In other words, even if the traditional criminal justice system were to utilize
procedures and produce outcomes which all of the experts agreed were fair and just, the
system would have no long-term viability if the individuals within the system-victims and
defendants-perceived it to be unfair.
170. Tom R. Tyler, Social Justice: Outcome and Procedure, 35 INT'L J. PSYCHOL. 117,
121 (2000).
171. Id.; see also E. Allan Lind et al., Voice, Control, and Procedural Justice:
Instrumental and Noninstrumental Concerns in Fairness Judgments, 59 J. PERSONALITY &
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views the decisionmaker as neutral and unbiased; that is, whether the
rules are impartially followed and the decisionmaker appears
motivated to be fair to both sides in a given case.17 2 The final
consideration is whether the individual is treated with dignity and
respect during the process.173
In a recent article, Professor Michael O'Hear noted that plea
bargaining has the potential to fulfill the criteria for procedural justice
better than the traditional criminal trial, at least with respect to the
defendant.'74 Professor O'Hear divides plea bargains into two
different categories: "routine case processing" and the "adversarial
interaction."' Routine case processing, which is more common for
high volume misdemeanors and low level felonies, does not really
involve bargaining or negotiating, but merely involves reviewing the
police report to learn the key facts for the alleged crime and then
telling the defense attorney the preestablished offer for that
particular offense. This process resembles " 'less a Middle Eastern
bazaar than shopping in a supermarket.' "176 This category of plea
bargains does not fulfill many of the requirements of procedural
justice, mostly because the defendant has "no real voice in the
process.""7
Adversarial interaction, on the other hand, occurs when the
prosecutor and defense attorney cannot agree quickly on the going
rate for the specific offense with which the defendant is charged. In
these cases, the prosecutor has three options: she can engage in
"horse trading" by simply offering a lower sentence than the going
rate; she can withdraw from negotiations altogether; or she can
"adopt a position of principled engagement" by discussing the merits
SOC. PSYCHOL. 952, 952-59 (1990) (testing empirically both instrumental and
noninstrumental voice effects on judgments of fairness of procedures). One study found
that allowing victims to testify at sentencing hearings increased the victim's perception of
the fairness of the process even if their arguments had no effect on the ultimate sentence
given to the defendant. See Anne M. Heinz & Wayne A. Kerstetter, Pretrial Settlement
Conference: Evaluation of a Reform in Plea Bargaining, 13 LAW & SOc'Y REV. 349, 364
(1979).
172. See Tyler, supra note 170, at 122; Tom R. Tyler & E. Allan Lind, A Relational
Model of Authority in Groups, in 25 ADVANCES IN EXPERIMENTAL SOCIAL
PSYCHOLOGY 115, 153-58 (Mark P. Zanna ed., 1992) (explaining the preconditions for
the effective functioning of authorities).
173. See Tyler, supra note 170, at 122.
174. Michael M. O'Hear, Plea Bargaining and Procedural Justice, 42 GA. L. REV. 407,
410-13 (2008).
175. Id. at 415.
176. Id. at 416 (quoting MALCOLM M. FEELEY, THE PROCESS IS THE PUNISHMENT:
HANDLING CASES IN A LOWER CRIMINAL COURT 187-88 (1979)).
177. Id. at 417.
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and equities of the case with the defense attorney and the client.178
Principled engagement, unlike the other two options, creates a
situation where the prosecutor is at least willing to listen to the
defendant's story and is potentially amenable to the idea of reducing
or changing the offer in response to what the defendant says.
Obviously it is only this last option-adversarial interactions in
which the prosecutors enter into principled engagement-which has
any hope of increasing the level of procedural justice for the
defendant.'79 As O'Hear notes, the prosecutor himself usually decides
what type of bargaining will occur and what stance she will take in
that bargaining, since the pressures of the system almost always result
in a guilty plea for the defendant regardless of how the prosecutor
conducts the negotiation. Therefore, in order to enhance the level of
procedural justice in the plea bargaining context, O'Hear proposes
training prosecutors in the importance of giving defendants a
meaningful opportunity to convey their side of the story (what he
calls providing "meaningful voice opportunities")..o and encouraging
prosecutors whenever possible to adopt a position of principled
engagement.' 1 He also encourages prosecutors to treat defendants
with respect and dignity throughout the process. 8 2 In addition,
178. Id. at 417-18.
179. As O'Hear says, there are
two areas of procedural justice concern: the defendant who is railroaded into
accepting a deal without first having a meaningful opportunity to tell his or her
side of the story [(in the "routine case processing" scenario)], and the defendant
who faces a high-handed prosecutor unwilling to address his or her view of the
case in a principled fashion [(prosecutors in the adversarial interaction scenario
who do not engage in principled engagement)].
Id. at 419-20.
180. Id. at 447-49.
181. Id. at 431. O'Hear offers five protocols that could enhance the procedural justice
of plea bargaining:
(1) before starting plea negotiations, ensure that defendants have had a
meaningful opportunity to tell their side of the story, either through police officers
during pre-charge processing or through counsel after charging; (2) develop
objective criteria to guide plea negotiations; (3) explain positions taken in
negotiations; (4) expressly acknowledge arguments for more lenient treatment;
and (5) refrain from pressure tactics like exploding offers and charging threats.
Id.
182. Id. at 429-30. For example, O'Hear suggests that prosecutors "take care to use the
appropriate honorific when referring to the defendant (e.g., Mr. Smith, Ms. Jones) and
discourage unnecessary handcuffing and other forms of rough treatment." Id. at 430.
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O'Hear argues that prosecutors should develop-and convey to
defendants-objective criteria to guide plea bargaining decisions.183
What proportion of plea bargains already involve principled
engagement, or how many prosecutors currently refer to objective
criteria and treat the defendants with respect during the process is an
open question, but at least these factors are possible in the process of
public plea bargaining. And, as O'Hear points out, if procedural
justice is a desirable goal, then it would be relatively inexpensive in
most jurisdictions to adjust the methods of plea bargaining to enhance
these elements of the process. *
But private criminal settlements offer no such possibilities. There
is no unbiased, neutral decisionmaker applying objective criteria
when a private party bargains with the perpetrator, and there is no
real hope of imposing such criteria. Whether defendants are treated
with respect in these private negotiations will depend on the private
party conducting the negotiation. Some private parties will treat the
perpetrator with dignity and avoid unnecessary threats and
humiliation, but some will not. Most crucially, there is no way to
change the system in order to ensure that the person negotiating with
the perpetrator treats him with respect during the process. Unlike
prosecutors, the private parties who conduct these negotiations
cannot be trained to act in a certain way or sanctioned if they fail to
do so. Of course, the defendant will be allowed to tell his story,
probably more so than in most public plea bargaining situations, but
whether the private party conducting the negotiation pays any
attention to the defendant's story by engaging in principled
engagement will vary from case to case. Again, there is no way to
train the private parties or regulate their conduct while engaging in
the settlement negotiations, so there is no way to systematically
increase the level of procedural justice in the process.'
3. Shifting Power from Judges to Prosecutors
A third potential benefit that plea bargains provide to the
criminal justice system is the shift in adjudicatory power from judges
to prosecutors. The traditional criminal justice system divides power
among various actors: prosecutors have the original charging power;
183. Id. at 428-29.
184. Id. at 469.
185. It could be argued that private criminal settlements enhance the level of
procedural justice for the victims, who experience very little procedural justice in the
public criminal justice system, whether a case is plea bargained away or goes to trial.
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juries decide guilt or innocence; and judges set the appropriate
sentence if the defendant is convicted. During the plea bargaining
negotiation process, the prosecutor assumes all three roles, as he or
she becomes de facto adjudicator and sentencing authority. When
plea bargaining becomes as ubiquitous as it is under the current
system, this represents a significant shift in the balance of power in
the criminal justice system.
Critics of plea bargaining see this shift as a negative
development. Professor Alschuler argues that the process
tends to make figureheads of judges, whose power over the
administration of criminal justice has largely been transferred
to people of less experience, who commonly lack the
information that judges could secure, whose temperaments
have been shaped by their partisan duties, and who have not
been charged by the electorate with the important
responsibilities that they have assumed.186
The lack of experience and legitimacy are important concerns,
but probably the most troubling aspect about this shift in power is
that a prosecutor is meant to be both an advocate for the state and a
neutral adjudicator, zealously pursuing the case but at the same time
willing to offer a plea deal which represents the most "just"
disposition for the case. It is certainly not impossible for a prosecutor
to take on both roles' 87-indeed, most prosecutors are committed to
ensuring a just resolution for each of their cases. But at the very least
the breakdown of the separation of powers between the judge and the
prosecutor gives an appearance of impropriety.
Other commentators have seen the shift in power from
prosecutors to judges as a positive development.188 In the modern
criminal justice system, plea bargaining involves more than just a
reduction of sentence based on the risk of acquittal; it also involves
the exercise of discretion on the part of the prosecutor.189 In other
words, a prosecutor who offers a plea bargain is making a
determination that the proposed disposition is a just and fair
resolution of the case-a determination based on her expertise and
her duty to do justice for the citizens of her jurisdiction.
186. Alschuler, Right to Trial, supra note 117, at 933.
187. See, e.g., H. Richard Uviller, The Neutral Prosecutor: The Obligation of Dispassion
in a Passionate Pursuit, 68 FORDHAM L. REv. 1695, 1713-18 (2000).
188. See, e.g., Lynch, supra note 14, at 2124-36.
189. Id.
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A prosecutor's exercise of discretion at the plea bargaining stage
can be broken down into three different categories. First, the
prosecutor makes a calculation about the risks of going to trial and
the cost to the system of litigating a case, and offers a discount to the
defendant based on these two factors. How much each factor weighs
into this discount will vary widely depending on the case. For
example, in a rape case which relies heavily on the testimony of a
victim with credibility problems, the prosecutor may be quite
concerned about the risk of acquittal and offer a significantly reduced
sentence. On the other hand, if the crime is a minor one, such as
shoplifting an item of small value, a guilty verdict may be assured-
but the prospect of using up even a few hours of a judge's and jury's
time on the case may convince the prosecutor to offer a similarly
sized reduction. As repeat players in the system, prosecutors will
develop quite a bit of expertise in making these calculations-both in
terms of the chances of conviction and the likelihood of conviction.
The second way a prosecutor will exercise discretion in the plea
bargaining process is by choosing among a number of different crimes
to find the most appropriate to which the defendant can plead. The
prosecutor (or police officer) has already exercised discretion in the
charging decision, selecting the appropriate crime from the vast (and
growing) list of criminal prohibitions passed by the legislature.
Professor Landes and Judge Posner have called this the problem of
"discretionary nonenforcement" and have argued that a public
monopoly on criminal enforcement is a necessary condition for the
practice.190 According to Landes and Posner, the criminal justice
system requires a great deal of discretionary nonenforcement because
it is impossible for legislatures to write laws with sufficient precision
to perfectly cover only those who are guilty of crimes and not also
potentially cover those who are innocent.191
The third and related way that prosecutors exercise discretion in
conducting plea bargaining is in setting punishment. In theory, a
prosecutor will seek the socially optimal punishment for each crime
based on the culpability of the defendant. Critics of plea bargaining,
of course, see this as a cost of plea bargaining, if not an outright
travesty of justice: the judge is the neutral party that is supposed to
190. Landes & Posner, supra note 10, at 38-41.
191. Id. at 38. Landes and Posner write that the broad laws passed by legislatures could
potentially lead to overinclusion-that is, criminal laws being enforced against the
innocent. Discretionary nonenforcement is the most efficient way to reduce the costs of
overinclusion, without increasing the dangers of underinclusion (which would occur if
legislatures tried to craft their criminal laws more narrowly). Id.
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set the punishment, and delegating this power to one of the parties in
the case (who may only be a few years out of law school) subverts the
adversarial nature of the system."* On the other hand, prosecutors
have a sworn obligation to seek justice, and many of them take that
duty seriously when plea bargaining. Prosecutors are able to listen to
equitable arguments from the defense attorney and the victims, and-
compared to judges-they have the time to investigate these
arguments and greater discretion to respond to them.
In the end, whether the derogation of power from judges to
prosecutors is a negative or positive development remains an open
question. When the same analysis is applied to private criminal
settlements, however, the answer is clear: a further derogation of
power from prosecutors to private parties results in a net loss of
justice.
As noted above,'93 the parties in a private criminal settlement
will frequently have limited or no experience in the criminal justice
system; thus, they may end up with settlements which have very little
relationship to what an eventual outcome at trial might have been.
More significantly, the private individual, whether a victim or a
witness, who bargains with a perpetrator is presumably only trying to
get the greatest possible gain out of the transaction, without any
concern whether the ultimate disposition is just for the perpetrator or
beneficial to society. Furthermore, a prosecutor can (and does) think
about whether it is sensible to expend a certain amount of resources
to prosecute a minor crime. A private party will have no such
consideration-he or she will decide to settle the case privately or call
the police based only on his or her own individual cost.
Furthermore, the parties who negotiate a private criminal
settlement do not practice discretionary nonenforcement, at least not
knowingly. As long as the private party negotiating with the
perpetrator believed that he or she could receive some consideration
in exchange for the private criminal settlement, he or she might
threaten to report perpetrators for every minor infraction of the
broadly worded (and extensive) criminal law, leading to
overenforcement. 19 4 And of course a private party is not likely to seek
justice in setting punishment; frequently she will seek to maximize the
amount she can get out of the perpetrator, regardless of how culpable
192. See, e.g., Alschuler, Trial Judge's Role, supra note 117, at 1063.
193. See supra Part III.B.4.
194. See supra Part III.B.4.
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the perpetrator is."'9 A private party will (presumably) not care about
the mens rea of the defendant, nor about the cost to society, nor any
of the other many factors that make up the complex calculus of
criminal liability.
4. Preserving Relationships
Private criminal settlements do offer one potential benefit that
plea bargaining does not provide: parties who engage in private
criminal settlements are more likely to maintain any preexisting long
term relationships, whether it is a personal relationship (such as
husband and wife), or a professional one (such as employer and
employee, or teacher and student). Contacting the authorities
frequently causes significant, and perhaps irreparable, damage to
these relationships. After the first contact, the criminal justice system
puts additional strain on these relationships by putting the victim and
the defendant in adversarial positions and forcing the victim to make
statements against the perpetrator and (at least occasionally) to
testify against him in court.
In contrast, private criminal settlements create a situation where
the victim and perpetrator are working together-both to resolve the
dispute in the first place and to ensure that the perpetrator ultimately
satisfies the obligation he has undertaken. The victim-centered nature
of the resolution may also help to mend the relationship rather than
tearing it further apart, allowing the victim to feel that the perpetrator
is atoning for his action.
Of course, not all of these relationships are worth preserving-in
many cases, it may be best to fire the embezzling employee or leave
the abusive spouse. Moreover, many private criminal settlements do
not involve a preexisting relationship at all. However, under the right
conditions, private criminal settlements could help to preserve certain
relationships if both parties are inclined to do so.
5. The Narrow Benefits of Private Criminal Settlements
Viewing private criminal settlements as an analogue to public
plea bargains provides a number of strong justifications for banning
the practice. Although both the private and public processes follow
195. There are exceptions, of course. If the private parties have an ongoing, continuing
relationship-as friends, family members, or coworkers-the victim may attempt to ensure
that the defendant is treated fairly and receives a just disposition. This possibility is
another reason why private criminal settlements should be permitted when there is a
preexisting relationship. See infra Part IV.A.
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the same pattern-delivering a lesser amount of punishment in
exchange for a smaller investment of resources-the intangible costs
associated with private criminal settlements are much greater. All of
the drawbacks of plea bargains-the lack of transparency, the
increased chance of wrongful convictions, the distorted results when
compared to the expected result at trial, and (to some extent) the
pernicious influence of economic inequality-apply with even greater
force to private criminal settlements. Meanwhile, two of the potential
benefits of plea bargaining-the increased level of procedural justice
and the increased amount of discretion given to a prosecutor who (at
least ideally) is seeking a just resolution of the case-are simply not
present in private criminal settlements. The only benefits private
criminal settlements offer is a greater potential for flexibility and
creativity in reaching a resolution (a dubious benefit in the criminal
justice context) and the possibility of preserving long-term
relationships between the perpetrator and the victim.
IV. IMPLICATIONS FOR LAWS REGULATING PRIVATE CRIMINAL
SETTLEMENTS
This Article has analyzed private criminal settlements through
the lenses of blackmail theory and plea bargaining theory in an
attempt to justify the current criminalization of such agreements. The
analysis leads to several conclusions about the justifications for
banning private criminal settlements, which in turn lead to
conclusions about how these settlements should be regulated.
A. Justifying the Ban on Private Criminal Settlements
The first conclusion is that the criminalization of these
settlements cannot be justified using blackmail theory.'96 Although
there are some dangers in allowing incriminatory blackmail, they can
be mitigated by criminalizing ongoing blackmail arrangements (which
could easily turn into conspiracies to cover up crimes) and increasing
penalties for the "negative externalities" of blackmail (such as theft,
fraud, and concealing evidence).'" It would also be sensible to
196. Berman, supra note 10, at 863 (defending the ban on incriminatory blackmail
because the criminal law "serves retributive, deterrent, incapacitative, and rehabilitative
goals that are not comparably well served by monetary (let alone confidential) settlement
between offender and victim"). But as we have seen, private criminal settlements do serve
a retributive and deterrent function and could also provide restitution to the victim of a
crime. Nor can a ban on incriminatory blackmail be justified based on the idea that we all
have a "moral duty" to report crime. See supra notes 77-87 and accompanying text.
197. See supra notes 68-71 and accompanying text.
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prohibit incriminatory blackmail on the part of those who have a
statutory duty to report specific crimes. With these safeguards, it
could be argued that incriminating blackmail provides a number of
benefits to society by creating at least some level of deterrence and
punishment in certain situations in which the crime would otherwise
go unreported.' 8 For example, crimes that occur between friends,
family members, or others who have preexisting relationships are less
likely to be reported to the authorities, but they could result in an
informal agreement between the perpetrator and the victim that
results in a rough restitution to the victim and a punishment against
the defendant (albeit a small one compared to what the criminal
justice system might impose). Likewise, private criminal settlements
as a result of commercial research blackmail produces punishment
for crimes that would otherwise go unpunished in the public criminal
justice system.
But analyzing these settlements as a private analogue to plea
bargains paints a different picture. The disadvantages of public plea
bargains have been well catalogued for decades, with numerous
commentators calling for an outright ban on the practice 99 while
others merely accept them as a necessary evil.20 Private criminal
settlements suffer from almost all of the defects of public plea
bargains and offer almost none of the potential advantages that plea
bargaining can provide. The only benefit that private criminal
settlements offer is the chance of preserving preexisting relationships
between the parties, relationships that might otherwise be damaged
or torn apart by the filing of formal criminal charges.
Comparing these two analyses side by side leads to a conclusion:
although the criminalization of private criminal settlements is
justified, there is a certain category of these agreements which ought
to be permitted. Specifically, private settlements should be permitted
between individuals who already have a preexisting relationship-a
relationship which is close enough that the victim is unlikely to report
the crime to the authorities anyway, and a relationship which might
be endangered if formal criminal charges are filed. The existence of a
preexisting relationship between the victim and the perpetrator will
likely facilitate more creative punishments or resolutions to the
198. See supra Part II.B.1.
199. See, e.g., Alschuler, Right to Trial, supra note 117, at 935-36; Stephen J.
Schulhofer, Plea Bargaining as Disaster, 101 YALE L.J. 1979, 2009 (1992).
200. See, e.g., Peter Arenella, Reforming the Federal Grand Jury and the State
Preliminary Hearing to Prevent Conviction Without Adjudication, 78 MICH. L. REV. 463,
524 (1980).
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dispute-that is, the parties will have options other than a simple
monetary payment. For example, the victim may require that the
perpetrator seek counseling or treatment in exchange for not
reporting the crime.
Commercial research blackmail, which appeared to offer
significant benefits under the blackmail analysis, fares quite poorly
when examined in the context of plea bargaining. First, there is no
long-term relationship to preserve between the private party and the
perpetrator. Second, the private party who conducts the commercial
research blackmail is likely to be a repeat player with an extensive
knowledge of the criminal justice system, resulting in a large
discrepancy in experience between the private party and the
perpetrator and an increased chance that the perpetrator will be
treated unfairly.
B. Current Laws Regarding Private Criminal Settlements
As noted above, most states prohibit incriminating blackmail
altogether,201 but a few allow the practice in limited circumstances.
The exact contours of the exceptions differ from jurisdiction to
jurisdiction. The Model Penal Code, for example, focuses on the
amount that is received by the blackmailer and whether the
blackmailer believed that amount to be a fair restitution: "It is an
affirmative defense to prosecution under this Section that the
pecuniary benefit did not exceed an amount which the actor believed
to be due as restitution or indemnification for harm caused by the
offense.""20
New York (which labels blackmail as "coercion") looks more
broadly at the purpose of the blackmailer:
In any prosecution for coercion committed by instilling in the
victim a fear that he or another person would be charged with a
crime, it is an affirmative defense that the defendant reasonably
believed the threatened charge to be true and that his sole
purpose was to compel or induce the victim to take reasonable
action to make good the wrong which was the subject of such
threatened charge.203
Ohio's exception for incriminatory blackmail is even broader,
providing a defense if "the actor's conduct was a reasonable response
201. See supra notes 35-36 and accompanying text.
202. MODEL PENAL CODE § 223.4 (1985).
203. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 135.75 (McKinney 2009).
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to the circumstances that occasioned it," and that the actor's purpose
was limited to "preventing or redressing a wrong or injustice." 204
These exceptions are probably derived from the retributive
justifications for criminalizing blackmail that were reviewed in Part I.
This is to be expected: if blackmail is criminalized because the
blackmailer is acting with blameworthy motives,205 then it makes
sense to exempt those blackmailers who are simply attempting to
"redress an injustice" or whose payment merely "makes good the
wrong" done by the perpetrator. But if blackmail theory cannot
justify criminalizing these agreements in the first place, then it makes
little sense to base the exceptions on the retributive theories of
blackmail.
Instead, our analysis of private criminal settlements as an
analogue to public plea bargaining leads to a somewhat different
conclusion: it is not the amount of the payment that matters, nor the
intent or purpose of the blackmail, but rather the relationship
between the two parties that is critical. If the victim and the
perpetrator share a close relationship that predates the crime itself,
then a private criminal settlement is less harmful to society. In fact, it
may help society since the private settlement will provide
punishment, deterrence, and restitution in a situation where the
public criminal justice system would likely never become involved.
In fact, laws derived from the Model Penal Code, which limits
the amount of payment to a reasonable level of restitution, are both
poor policy in theory and difficult to enforce in practice. The laws are
poor policy because they limit the effectiveness of private criminal
settlements. As we have seen, these settlements serve a purpose in
punishing and deterring the perpetrator. Usually the amount of
punishment imposed will be lower than what the perpetrator deserves
for the crime, since he is only agreeing to the private settlement in
order to avoid the full consequences of his actions. Placing a statutory
limit on the amount of punishment further reduces the level of
punishment and deterrence created by the settlement, thus
weakening one of the primary benefits of private criminal
settlements. Indeed, if the victim is only permitted to "make good the
wrong" that was done by the perpetrator, the punishment will be even
less likely to meet the objectives of the criminal justice system. For
example, a shoplifter would only have to pay for or return the item
204. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2905.12(C)(2) (LexisNexis 2010).
205. Berman, supra note 10, at 848.
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that he stole which provides little in the way of deterrence and does
not satisfy the retributive goals of the criminal justice system.
The laws are difficult to enforce because these agreements, by
their very nature, may not only involve monetary payment; they may
also (or exclusively) consist of the perpetrator promising to undertake
or abstain from an action. These nontraditional resolutions to a
criminal dispute may be hard to quantify and compare to the
"amount the actor believed to be due." For example, assume a
teacher or guidance counselor finds marijuana or cocaine in a
student's backpack and threatens to call the police on the student
unless he (1) throws away his stash, (2) anonymously reports the
name of the dealer to the police, and (3) attends a drug rehabilitation
program. If the teacher were later brought up on charges of
blackmail, how would a prosecutor or jury decide whether the teacher
believed her demands to be what she was due as "restitution" or
"indemnification" for the "harm caused by the offense," or even
whether her demands were "reasonable action[s] to make good the
wrong?"
Instead, exceptions to the blackmail law which permit private
criminal settlements should focus on the cases in which the victim and
the defendant are in a preexisting relationship. This relationship
should be (1) one that society wants to preserve and (2) one in which
the victim would be unlikely to report the crime to the public
authorities. The law could set out examples, such as immediate family
members, employer-employee relationships, and relationships
between students and teachers or school counselors. This would
permit private criminal settlements which are the most beneficial to
the criminal justice system.
CONCLUSION
Our criminal justice system has become increasingly privatized,
particularly at the detection and apprehension stage of the process.
As more perpetrators are caught by private parties, the opportunities
for private criminal settlements will become more numerous.
Simultaneously, legislatures continue to criminalize more types of
behavior and increase the severity of both sentences and collateral
consequences for all crimes-thus increasing the temptation for
victims and perpetrators to privately resolve their disputes.
Therefore, it is imperative to understand the costs and benefits of
these agreements in order to know whether and how they should be
regulated.
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Currently, private criminal settlements are almost universally
banned, but this ban exists for the wrong reason. Legislatures treat
private criminal settlements as blackmail and criminalize them
accordingly. But the justifications for criminalizing blackmail are
weak to begin with, and they become even weaker when applied to
incriminatory blackmail. Analyzing these agreements under the
blackmail paradigm therefore leads to overcriminalization and other
poor policy choices, such as artificial restrictions on the amount of
consideration the perpetrator is allowed to pay in those rare instances
when these agreements are permitted.
Instead, legislatures should view these private agreements as
another element of the growing private criminal justice system. It is
possible-perhaps even likely-that private mediators will soon begin
to take the place of public prosecutors and judges in order to resolve
these disputes.206 But until then, many crimes will continue to be
resolved informally by the parties involved, through a private
analogue to the plea bargaining that resolves most of the cases in the
public criminal justice system. Analyzing private criminal settlements
under this plea bargaining paradigm provides a sufficient justification
for criminalizing this conduct, since private criminal settlements
involve all of the costs of plea bargains but offer almost none of their
benefits.207 Our criminal justice system requires judges and
prosecutors to exercise discretion in choosing which crimes to
prosecute and what sentences to impose. Private individuals who
reach settlements with perpetrators will exercise that discretion for
their own selfish purposes, and this problem will be especially acute
when the witness or victim is a repeat player in the system, such as a
private security guard or a private investigator conducting
commercial research blackmail.
But if the witness or victim has a preexisting relationship with the
perpetrator, the private criminal settlement offers benefits which are
206. In an earlier article I argued that private criminal mediators could be a positive
development in the evolution of criminal law. See Simmons, supra note 13, at 988-90.
These systems of private criminal dispute resolution would offer many more advantages
over private plea bargains, not the least of which is that their processes can be regulated
by the state and their resolutions can be reviewed by the local prosecutor in ways which
are impossible in the context of private criminal settlements.
207. In the end, of course, these agreements may prove to be impossible to regulate,
particularly for smaller crimes. The incentives for each side to bypass the public criminal
justice system are quite strong; both parties will work to keep the arrangement secret, and
most prosecutors will be reluctant to bring charges in these cases even if they do learn
about them. But most of these agreements should remain illegal in order to provide some
level of deterrence against individuals who are tempted to engage in this behavior.
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not available in the public criminal justice system. Not only are the
settlements more efficient and flexible than plea bargains, but they
can also help preserve the relationship between the private parties.
Under current law, parties who enter into these beneficial agreements
are treated as criminals. Neither the blackmail paradigm nor the plea
bargaining paradigm can justify such treatment.
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